Call for a new Bretton Woods conference in order to design a new global financial system

It takes two
Bilateral talks between China and the US are the most likely way of solving the global financial crisis and reforming the IMF
Comments (8)

Harold James
guardian.co.uk, Friday 5 December 2008 14.30 GMT

The chaotic and costly international response to the world's current financial disorder has prompted Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown and German president Horst Köhler, a former head of the International Monetary Fund, to call for a new Bretton Woods conference in order to design a new global financial system. But such a demand depends on a clear understanding of what a new agreement might provide.
It is easy to see the appeal of scrapping today's global financial architecture, because there is obviously much that is broken. The existing institutions were looking increasingly irrelevant in normal times, and ineffective in times of crisis. Although the IMF delivered some gloomily accurate figures about the likely cost of the US housing fiasco, it played almost no role in addressing the current crisis. This was the first international financial crisis since the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 in which the Fund stood on the sidelines.
The major international actor, instead, has been the G7, a grouping dominated by medium-sized European states in which Asia's dynamic emerging economies – the current source of global savings – have no representation.
The Bretton Woods conference succeeded not because it assembled every state, or because the participants engaged in an extensive pow-wow. John Maynard Keynes, an architect of Bretton Woods, believed that the true lesson of the failures of the Depression-era 1930s lay precisely in the character of the large and chaotic 1933 London world economic conference. Keynes concluded that a really workable plan could be devised only at the insistence of "a single power or like-minded group of powers."
Keynes was basically right, but he should have added that it helps when one power can negotiate with one other power. In the past, the most effective financial diplomacy occurred bilaterally, between two powerful states that stood for different approaches to the international economy.
This was true of the preparations for the Bretton Woods meeting. Although there were 44 participating countries, only two really mattered, the UK and, above all, the US. The agreement was shaped by Anglo-American dialogue, with occasional mediation from France and Canada.
Bilateral talks subsequently remained the key to every major success of large-scale financial diplomacy. In the early 1970s, when the fixed exchange-rate regime came to an end, the IMF seemed to have outlived its function. Its articles of agreement were renegotiated by the US, which was looking for more flexibility, and France, which wanted something of the solidity and predictability of the old gold standard.
Later in the 1970s, European monetary relations were hopeless when France, Germany, and Britain tried to talk about them, but were straightened out when only France and Germany took part. In the mid-1980s, when wild exchange-rate swings produced calls for new trade protection measures, the US and Japan found a solution that involved exchange-rate stabilization.
So, what form should such bilateralism take today?
In terms of countries, the obvious new pair comprises the US, the world's largest debtor, and China, its greatest saver. In terms of themes, the conference would have to solve a new type of problem: how states should deal with the large flows of capital that over the past four decades have been mediated by the private sector.
Two alternative models seemed to work until 2008. On one side was the American model, with a variety of regulated banks, lightly regulated investment banks, and largely unregulated hedge funds managing the capital flows. On the other side was the Chinese solution, with increasingly costly reserve management giving way to activist sovereign wealth funds looking for strategic participation in investments abroad.
Both approaches were flawed – and liable to produce political controversy. The American model failed because banks proved to be highly vulnerable to panic once it became clear that sophisticated new financial instruments had formed a haystack spiked with sharp, dangerous, and indigestible losses. And, inevitably, today's big bailouts have been followed by a politically fraught discussion of which banks were rescued, and whose political interests were served. Already, there is a ferocious debate about the influence of Goldman Sachs on the US Treasury. Likewise, the very large European bailouts (totaling as much as 20% of GDP in Germany) have produced controversies about the distribution of costs.
Meanwhile, the Chinese solution gave rise to nationalist fears that sovereign wealth funds might be abused to seize strategically vital businesses or whole sectors of an economy.
The original inspiration behind the creation of the IMF was that a largely automatic and rule-governed body would be a less politicised way of stabilizing markets and expectations. That remains true today: managing temporary stakes in banks in need of recapitalisation, on behalf of large providers of capital (such as the Asian surplus countries), would put a neutral, depoliticised buffer between states and private-sector institutions.
The IMF was originally conceived in 1944 in a world without major private capital flows, one in which states undertook almost all international transactions. Extending its mission to include some private-sector rescues would recognize the preponderant role that markets now play. At the same time, the involvement of a rule-bound international agency would minimise the political poison associated with bank recapitalisations and currency interventions.
In cooperation with Project Syndicate, 2008.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/brettonwoods
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/05/global-economy-us-china-imf

**Desperate times: how the Fed plans to save the world

Economic policy
Desperate times: how the Fed plans to save the world
Larry Elliott, economics editor
The Guardian, Thursday 18 December 2008

The unusual measures unveiled this week by the Federal reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, promise to usher in an era of free money unprecedented in the history of financial markets. They include tools designed to lower long-term interest rates and boost growth in the world's biggest economy. Here we look at what the measures are, what they mean for you, and what will happen if they don't work.
Why has the Fed been forced to take such drastic steps?
After 18 months in which they have cut interest rates sharply, nationalised leading banks and provided tax rebates for consumers, US policymakers are now desperate to halt America's slide into a deep and painful recession. For historical reasons, fear of a slump runs as deep in the US as does fear of inflation in Germany, but all the conventional policy tools have so far failed. Non-farm jobs fell by more than 500,000 in November, the biggest drop since the mid-1970s, and the housing market is in freefall. Ben Bernanke is a former academic who specialised in the lessons of the Great Depression, one of which is that policymakers have to act fast and decisively to prevent a deflationary spiral setting in.
So what is the Fed proposing?
There are various forms of interest rates. Policy, or short-term, rates are set by central banks and affect the cost of money to the financial system. In the UK, the policy, or bank rate, is 2%. In the US, after Tuesday's cut, the Fed has set a target range of 0% to 0.25% - an all-time low. In normal circumstances, ultra-low policy rates make it easier for banks to lend money to their business and personal customers but these are not normal circumstances. The supply of credit has dried up as banks repair the damage to their balance sheets caused by losses on their ill-judged investments during the boom. Real borrowing rates for households and firms have fallen but not nearly so rapidly as have policy rates. The Fed's actions this week are aimed at cutting real borrowing costs.
How does it do this?
The Federal Reserve has already bought up mortgage-backed securities and the debts of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant state-owned mortgage finance companies. This week it said this programme would be stepped up and perhaps extended to purchases of longer-term treasury securities. Buying treasury bonds, the remedy proposed by Keynes in the 1930s and taken up by Franklin Roosevelt, is a radical step and as yet only being "evaluated" by the US central bank. But its aim is to drive down the long-term interest rates, normally set by buying and selling in the financial markets, through large-scale purchases of bonds. The interest rate - or yield - on bonds goes down as the price goes up, and buying bonds makes them more attractive by reducing the supply. Bringing down the interest rate on long-term bonds also brings down all other long-term interest rates, on fixed-rate mortgages, for example. It also gives the banks more money to lend because they exchange their bonds for money from the central bank.
So what's the drawback?
This process, known as quantitative easing, involves a huge expansion of the central bank's balance sheet so it can buy the bonds. It is not "printing money" since it no extra banknotes are churned out, but it gives the commercial banks more capital to lend on to their customers. To be effective, the central bank has to reassure financial markets that it will hold down long-term interest rates for as long as it takes to get credit markets working again. This means expanding the money supply, with the risk of re-igniting inflation once growth picks up. Bond markets are traditionally terrified by inflation and if investors start to believe that the central bank has lost control, a bond market bubble could potentially turn into a bond market bust.
What happens if it doesn't work?
In those circumstances, the next step will be wholesale use of fiscal policy. Keynes said in his General Theory that there might be cases when spirits in the private sector were so low that there would be no desire to borrow at any level of short-term or long-term interest rates. The state would then try to boost activity itself, either by public works or tax cuts. President-elect Barack Obama's plan for a fiscal boost worth 4% of GDP is an acceptance that quantitative easing might not be enough.
Anything else?
The economist Milton Friedman once said it would be theoretically possible for policymakers to end a depression by dumping wads of cash on the populace below from helicopters. This was cited by Bernanke in a paper in 2002, winning him the nickname Helicopter Ben. Other "unconventional" suggestions include providing consumers with time-limited spending vouchers that would force them to spend, or even making people pay banks for holding their money.
What does it mean for the UK?
The Bank of England and the Treasury are looking at whether quantitative easing would be possible in the UK. The upside would be that mortgage rates, overdrafts and business finance costs would fall if long-term interest rates declined. The downside would be if the markets became alarmed at the risks to inflation, turning the recent run on the pound into a full-blown sterling crisis. The pound does not have the dollar's reserve currency status so the UK is more vulnerable than the US.
Is there an alternative?
The other option is to do what the Austrian school of economists suggest: wait for the crisis to blow itself out. What is needed, they argue, is not shoring up a failed system but a period of creative destruction that will lay the foundations for stronger long-term growth. Politicians, who have elections to fight, find the do-nothing option somewhat unattractive.

Related
5 Dec 2008
American economy is in freefall
5 Dec 2008
Harold James: A new Bretton Woods hinges on negotiations between today's economic superpowers
15 Nov 2008
The G20: Who is there and how desperate are they?
16 Oct 2008
Joseph Stiglitz: Paulson tries again

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/dec/18/federal-reserve-measures-ben-bernnake

Savers seeking solution to financial crisis buy gold

There's gold in them thar' shops: the rush is on
Richard Wray
The Guardian, Thursday 2 October 2008

Tucked away beside the ornate entrance of the Savoy hotel in London are the discreet premises of ATS Bullion. Over the last few days staff there have witnessed an unprecedented phenomenon: queues.
The customers are wary savers looking to build their own solution to the global financial crisis and the parlous state of the banking system. They are buying gold.
"There has been enormous demand," said Sandra Conway, managing director at ATS, one of the UK's leading gold coin and bar merchants. "There are very few sellers of physical gold and we have actually had queues of people today."
The world's makers of gold bars and gold coins are running flat out to try to keep up with this surge in demand, but stocks are dwindling, especially of Krugerrands.
Named after Paul Kruger, who led the Boer resistance to the British at the turn of the 19th century, the coins were first minted in South Africa in 1967. Although it was illegal to import them into the UK during the 1970s and 1980s because of apartheid, they have become one of the most widely circulated gold coins in the world. But the £547 coins are becoming more scarce as investors snap them up.
As a result, the Rand Refinery is now operating seven days a week, as is the Austrian mint, which produces the popular Vienna Philharmonic coin.
The US Mint, responsible for ensuring an adequate supply of American coinage since 1792, has been forced to halt sales of its American Buffalo solid 24 carat gold coin because it was running out of supplies. It is also limiting the availability of its 22 carat American Eagle alternative.
Canny investors had also noticed that both one ounce coins cost less than an ounce of gold on the open market at the time, making them incredibly tempting to anyone looking to make a quick return. Having broken through the $1,000 barrier earlier in the year, the gold price has retreated slightly and is now trading at around $880 an ounce. The 2007 American Eagle one ounce coin, however, was going for $789.95 while the 2006 Buffalo coin cost $800 - offering the potential for an instant return of $80-$90.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/02/banking.economics

Helicopter money - a short guide

Helicopter money - a short guide
Ashley Seager
The Guardian, Thursday 18 December 2008

The idea of dropping money from a helicopter sounds great, particularly if you are lucky enough to be standing under one. But surely it would only happen in a banana republic or some weird work of fiction? Well, maybe.
The term "helicopter money" is on everyone's lips thanks to Ben Bernanke, the head of the US central bank, the Federal Reserve. Dubbed "Helicopter Ben" by his critics, he has been associated with the idea since he gave a speech in 1992 quoting legendary economist Milton Friedman as proposing it in extremis should deflation - or continually falling prices - ever grip a modern economy.
There are now fears that exactly that might be about to happen. On Tuesday night the Fed slashed interest rates to nearly zero in a bid to breathe some life into the collapsing US economy. The Bank of England looks about to do the same thing here. But both central banks are worried that cutting rates to zero may not on its own stop the rot so they are considering radical next steps to pump money into the economy to get people and businesses spending again.
The plan is known as "quantitative easing" which in layman's language means increasing the quantity of money in the economy rather than lowering its price by cutting interest rates. At first instance this will involve buying up government bonds, known as gilts, from individuals and pension funds, for an attractive price. As bonds are a form of saving, if you swap them for cash people are more likely to spend it.
If that doesn't work the government could simply give cash handouts. Poor pensioners or working people would be the priority, as they can be relied on to spend it. You can even issue time-limited spending vouchers for shops. You don't, in reality, need helicopters to do that, but it's a nice image.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/dec/18/useconomy-economics

Financial Services Industry: How things can have gone so wrong

Op-Ed Columnist
The Madoff Economy

By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: December 19, 2008

The revelation that Bernard Madoff — brilliant investor (or so almost everyone thought), philanthropist, pillar of the community — was a phony has shocked the world, and understandably so. The scale of his alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme is hard to comprehend.

Yet surely I’m not the only person to ask the obvious question: How different, really, is Mr. Madoff’s tale from the story of the investment industry as a whole?
The financial services industry has claimed an ever-growing share of the nation’s income over the past generation, making the people who run the industry incredibly rich. Yet, at this point, it looks as if much of the industry has been destroying value, not creating it. And it’s not just a matter of money: the vast riches achieved by those who managed other people’s money have had a corrupting effect on our society as a whole.
Let’s start with those paychecks. Last year, the average salary of employees in “securities, commodity contracts, and investments” was more than four times the average salary in the rest of the economy. Earning a million dollars was nothing special, and even incomes of $20 million or more were fairly common. The incomes of the richest Americans have exploded over the past generation, even as wages of ordinary workers have stagnated; high pay on Wall Street was a major cause of that divergence.
But surely those financial superstars must have been earning their millions, right? No, not necessarily. The pay system on Wall Street lavishly rewards the appearance of profit, even if that appearance later turns out to have been an illusion.
Consider the hypothetical example of a money manager who leverages up his clients’ money with lots of debt, then invests the bulked-up total in high-yielding but risky assets, such as dubious mortgage-backed securities. For a while — say, as long as a housing bubble continues to inflate — he (it’s almost always a he) will make big profits and receive big bonuses. Then, when the bubble bursts and his investments turn into toxic waste, his investors will lose big — but he’ll keep those bonuses.
O.K., maybe my example wasn’t hypothetical after all.
So, how different is what Wall Street in general did from the Madoff affair? Well, Mr. Madoff allegedly skipped a few steps, simply stealing his clients’ money rather than collecting big fees while exposing investors to risks they didn’t understand. And while Mr. Madoff was apparently a self-conscious fraud, many people on Wall Street believed their own hype. Still, the end result was the same (except for the house arrest): the money managers got rich; the investors saw their money disappear.
We’re talking about a lot of money here. In recent years the finance sector accounted for 8 percent of America’s G.D.P., up from less than 5 percent a generation earlier. If that extra 3 percent was money for nothing — and it probably was — we’re talking about $400 billion a year in waste, fraud and abuse.
But the costs of America’s Ponzi era surely went beyond the direct waste of dollars and cents.
At the crudest level, Wall Street’s ill-gotten gains corrupted and continue to corrupt politics, in a nicely bipartisan way. From Bush administration officials like Christopher Cox, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, who looked the other way as evidence of financial fraud mounted, to Democrats who still haven’t closed the outrageous tax loophole that benefits executives at hedge funds and private equity firms (hello, Senator Schumer), politicians have walked when money talked.
Meanwhile, how much has our nation’s future been damaged by the magnetic pull of quick personal wealth, which for years has drawn many of our best and brightest young people into investment banking, at the expense of science, public service and just about everything else?
Most of all, the vast riches being earned — or maybe that should be “earned” — in our bloated financial industry undermined our sense of reality and degraded our judgment.
Think of the way almost everyone important missed the warning signs of an impending crisis. How was that possible? How, for example, could Alan Greenspan have declared, just a few years ago, that “the financial system as a whole has become more resilient” — thanks to derivatives, no less? The answer, I believe, is that there’s an innate tendency on the part of even the elite to idolize men who are making a lot of money, and assume that they know what they’re doing.
After all, that’s why so many people trusted Mr. Madoff.
Now, as we survey the wreckage and try to understand how things can have gone so wrong, so fast, the answer is actually quite simple: What we’re looking at now are the consequences of a world gone Madoff.


http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/opinion/19krugman.html?em

The Reckoning: On Wall Street, Bonuses, Not Profits, Were Real

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/business/18pay.html?em=&pagewanted=all

Harvard Endowment Fund had fallen 22 percent

Harvard Endowment Managers Made $26.8 Million

By GERALDINE FABRIKANT
Published: December 19, 2008
The Harvard Management Company, which handles the university’s endowment, said on Friday that the compensation for five of its top managers and its former chief executive was $26.8 million for the fiscal year ended June 30.
The amount included $921,000 for the former chief executive, Mohamed El-Erian, who left in the middle of the fiscal year and returned to the Pacific Investment Management Company. The value of the endowment at the end of fiscal 2008 was $36.9 billion.
The highest paid of the six men was Stephen Blyth, managing director for international fixed income, who received $6.4 million.
Marc Seidner, managing director for domestic fixed income, received $6.3 million; Stanley Zuzic, senior vice president for domestic equities, got $4.9 million; Steven Alperin, managing director for emerging market equities, $4.4 million; and Andrew Wiltshire, managing director for natural resources, $3.9 million.
In past years, the compensation of the endowment’s managers prompted controversy because some academicians and alumni viewed it as excessive in the context of an academic institution.
In the wake of the controversy, Jack Meyer, the chief executive, left in 2005 to form his own hedge fund.
In 2003, the top group of managers earned $107.5 million. A year later, the figure was $78.4 million. In 2005, the board of the management company cut it to $56.8 million.
Since then, Harvard Management’s board has put in place mechanisms to limit the total annual compensation. Internal managers are compensated in a package that includes a bonus calculated on the value added in excess of specific market index benchmarks. Last year, the endowment posted an 8.6 percent return.
After Mr. El-Erian’s departure, Robert S. Kaplan, a professor of management at Harvard Business School, served as chief executive without compensation. Since July, the endowment has been run by Jane L. Mendillo, who formerly ran the Wellesley endowment.
Recently, Harvard announced that the value of the endowment had fallen 22 percent as of the end of October and that it could decline 30 percent by the end of the 2009 fiscal year.
Many schools have taken the unusual step of putting out interim numbers in part to provide some guidance about necessary belt-tightening measures.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/business/20harvard.html?ref=business

Foreign Investors Trade Safe for Safest

Foreign Investors Trade Safe for Safest
('Despite U.S. backing, bonds issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have skeptics.')


By FLOYD NORRIS
Published: December 19, 2008
AS foreign investors pour cash into United States securities, particularly short-term Treasury bills, they are pulling it out of the higher-yielding bonds issued by the government supported-entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.



Foreign purchases of government securities

The moves appear to indicate that even after the government bailout of the two agencies, there is some lingering doubt that the government would actually stand behind their debts if their situation grew much worse.
The Treasury Department reported this week that in October, overseas investors and governments were net sellers of $50 billion of agency securities, even though they yield significantly more than comparable Treasuries, which the investors bought at a record rate.
Over the summer, prices of agency securities fell as the financial crisis grew worse and some investors began to doubt whether the “implicit” government guarantee behind the agencies could be trusted. In July and August, foreigners were net sellers of $64 billion of such securities, an outflow unlike any previously seen.
That flight was one reason the government stepped in on Sept. 7 to effectively nationalize the agencies, although shares remain publicly traded. At first investors seemed reassured, but the confidence has now waned.
Despite the nationalization, the government has stopped short of putting its full faith and credit behind the bonds. The new data is the first indication that may have mattered to many overseas investors.
The accompanying chart at the top shows the monthly flows this year of foreign cash into Treasury securities and agency securities. More foreign money came into Treasuries in October — almost $91 billion — than in any previous month.
Most of the money — $56 billion in October — has gone into Treasury bills rather than into longer-dated bonds and notes. That flow helped to push down interest rates on bills to historically low levels, sometimes even a bit below zero, as investors sought complete safety.
Until the housing market began to show significant weakness in 2007, foreign flows into agency securities were running at almost $300 billion a year, and the flow stayed strong until the summer scare.
The other chart shows that over the 12 months through October, foreigners put just $65 billion into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the lowest for any such period since 1998. Unless there was a revival of overseas interest in those securities in November and December, 2008 could become the first year to see net sales, at least since the data became available in the early 1990s.
Until the late 1990s there was relatively little overseas investment in agency securities. But as the Clinton-era budget surpluses reduced the supply of available Treasuries, foreign investors discovered these investments, which seemed to be close substitutes. Even after large budget deficits resumed early this decade, the overseas demand for agencies continued to grow until questions about their solvency began to be heard.
Now, virtually all the foreign money is going into Treasuries — at a rate of more than half a trillion dollars a year.

Floyd Norris comments on finance and economics in his blog at nytimes.com/norris.







http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/business/worldbusiness/20charts.html?ref=business

Dollar roars back as global debts are called in

Dollar roars back as global debts are called in
For six years the world has been borrowing dollars to bet on property, oil, metals, emerging markets, and every bubble in every corner of the globe.

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard Last Updated: 3:48PM BST 23 Oct 2008

The strong rebound in the dollar has surprised some analysts
This has been the dollar "carry trade", conducted on a huge scale with high leverage. Now the process has reversed abruptly as debt deflation - or "deleveraging" - engulfs world markets. The dollars must be repaid.
Hence a wild scramble for Greenbacks which has shaken the global currency system and shattered assumptions about the way the world works. The unwinding drama reached a crescendo yesterday as the euro fell to $1.28, down from $1.61 in July. The slide in the Brazilian real, the South African rand, the Indian rupee, and the Korean won, among others, has been stunning.
Stephen Jen, currency chief at Morgan Stanley, said US mutual funds, pension funds, and life insurers invested a big chunk of their $22 trillion (£13.5 trillion) of assets overseas to earn a higher yield during the boom. They are now in hot retreat as the emerging market story unravels. "There is a complete rethink going on. People are bringing their money back home," he said.
Hedge funds are 75pc dollar-based, regardless of where they come from. Many are now having to repatriate their dollars as margin calls, client withdrawls, and the need to slash risk forces them to cut leverage. The hedge fund industry had assets of $1.9 trillion at the peak of the bubble.
Data collected by the Bank for International Settlements shows that European and UK banks have five times as much exposure to emerging markets as US and Japans banks, with surprisingly big bets in Latin America and emerging Asia - where they rely on dollar funding rather than euros.
The fear is that deflating booms in these frontier economies will have an 'asymettric' effect on the currency markets, setting off another round of frantic dollar buying. "It is not impossible that the euro could collapse completely against the dollar, going back to 2001 levels," said Mr Jen.
He said the "composite" dollar-zone including China, the Gulf oil states, and other countries locked into the US currency system, will together have a current account surplus next year. The de-facto euro bloc of the core euro-zone and Eastern Europe is moving into substantial deficit. This creates a subtle bias in support of the dollar.
Of course, much of the currency shift this year is a natural swing as the crisis rotates from the US to Europe and beyond. The dollar was pummelled in the early phase of the crunch when economists still thought Europe, Japan, China and the rest of the world would decouple, powering ahead under their own steam. The Federal Reserve's dramatic rate cuts were seen then as a reason to dump the dollar.
The decoupling myth has now died. The euro-zone and Japan appear to have fallen into recession before the US itself, led by a precipitous fall in German manufacturing.
The ultra-hawkish stance of the European Central Bank - which raised rates in July - is now viewed as a weakness. Foreign exchange markets are no longer chasing the highest interest yield: they are instead punishing those where the authorities are slowest to respond to the downturn.
A hard-hitting report by Citigroup this week said the ECB had unwisely ignored screaming signals from the bond markets earlier this year for a rate cut. "The ECB did not listen. Not only did they no reduce rates as they should have but they increased them in one of the biggest policy mistakes of 2008," it said.
The spectacular dollar rebound has geostrategic implications. Heady talk earlier this year that dollar hegemeny was coming to an end - or indeed that the US was losing its status as a financial superpower - now seems very wide of the mark.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/3242927/Dollar-roars-back-as-global-debts-are-called-in.html

ZIRP: Welcome to the world of sub-zero returns

ZIRP: Welcome to the world of sub-zero returns
Zero is a hard number to understand. In multiplication, it turns other values to nought. In division, it turns them to infinity. In finance, it turns the world upside down. No wonder investors are dizzy.

By Edward Hadas, breakingviews.comLast Updated: 12:50PM GMT 18 Dec 2008
The US is repeating a Japanese experiment with a zero in one of the most important variables in financial markets: the official overnight interest rate. This "Zirp" (zero interest rate policy) is combined with a nearly infinite quantity of government borrowing. The US government is expected to stimulate the economy - well into what looks like a bad recession - with as much as $850bn of new debt.
Meanwhile, the recession is inspiring a flight to safety. That means buying government bonds. The 2.2pc yield on the 10-year US Treasury could approach zero if the Federal Reserve follows up on hints that it will start buying Treasuries itself. So bond prices could move higher. But in the currency market, mega-debts and mini-yields are harmful, which is why the dollar has fallen back from Y98 to Y88 in a month.
The combination of falling yields and falling currency is illogical for a country that depends heavily on foreign capital. But in the Zirp world, many things don't quite stack up. The US isn't the only country that offers this investment conundrum. Take the UK, which is similarly indebted, and similarly borrowing more. The country is heading quickly towards Zirp, with the overnight rate of 2pc likely to be cut in half in January. The 10-year gilt yields a low 3.2pc. And the pound has tumbled as fast as the dollar, from E1.18 to E1.08 in a month.
The move towards Zirp is widespread. Japan never really left, and the eurozone is gradually getting there. The thinking is that free money will keep the credit system from freezing up, while higher government deficits should keep demand from collapsing.
But the policies aren't obviously working. The best that can be said so far is that the world could be in even worse shape without them. As no plausible alternatives are on offer, investors should expect more Zirp.
And that points to many sub-zero returns.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/breakingviewscom/3832292/ZIRP-Welcome-to-the-world-of-sub-zero-returns.html

Comment: ZIRP = Zero reward to creditors

**Debt deflation is tightening its grip over the entire global system.

Deflation virus is moving the policy test beyond the 1930s extremes
Debt deflation is tightening its grip over the entire global system. Interest rates are creeping towards zero in Japan, America, and now across most of Europe.

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business EditorLast Updated: 5:50AM GMT 09 Dec 2008
Comments 187 Comment on this article

China will not lift us out - they are the most vulnerable of all Photo: AP
We are beyond the extremes of the 1930s. The frontiers of monetary policy are being pushed to limits that may now test viability of paper currencies and modern central banking.
You cannot drop below zero. So what next if the credit markets refuse to thaw? Yes, Japan visited and survived this policy Hell during its lost decade, but that was a local affair in an otherwise booming global economy. It tells us nothing.
This time we are all going down together. There is no deus ex machina to lift us out. Certainly not China, which is the most vulnerable of all.
As the risk grows, officials at the highest level of the British Government have begun to circulate a six-year-old speech by Ben Bernanke – at the time of its writing, a garrulous kid governor at the US Federal Reserve. Entitled Deflation: Making Sure It Doesn’t Happen Here, it is the manual of guerrilla tactics for defeating slumps by monetary means.
“The US government has a technology, called a printing press, that allows it to produce as many US dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost,” he said.
Critics had great fun with this when Bernanke later became Fed chief. But the speech is best seen as a thought experiment by a Princeton professor thinking aloud during the deflation mini-scare of 2002.
His point was that central banks never run out of ammunition. They have an inexhaustible arsenal. The world’s fate now hangs on whether he was right (which is probable), or wrong (which is possible).
As a scholar of the Great Depression, Bernanke does not think that sliding prices can safely be allowed to run their course. “Sustained deflation can be highly destructive to a modern economy,” he said.
Once the killer virus becomes lodged in the system, it leads to a self-reinforcing debt trap – the real burden of mortgages rises, year after year, house prices falling, year after year. The noose tightens until you choke. Subtly, it shifts wealth from workers to bondholders. It is reactionary poison. Ultimately, it leads to civic revolt. Democracies do not tolerate such social upheaval for long. They change the rules.
Bernanke’s central claim is that the big guns of monetary policy were never properly deployed during the Depression, or during the early years of Japan’s bust, so no wonder the slumps dragged on.
The Fed can create money out of thin air and mop up assets on the open market, like a sovereign sugar daddy. “Sufficient injections of money will ultimately always reverse a deflation.”
Bernanke said the Fed can “expand the menu of assets that it buys”. US Treasury bonds top the list, but it can equally purchase mortgage securities from US agencies such as Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie, or company bonds, or commercial paper. Any asset will do.
The Fed can acquire houses, stocks, or a herd of Texas Longhorn cattle if it wants. It can even scatter $100 bills from helicopters. (Actually, Japan is about to do this with shopping coupons).
All the Fed needs is emergency powers under Article 13 (3) of its code. This “unusual and exigent circumstances” clause was indeed invoked – very quietly – in March to save the US investment bank Bear Stearns.
There has been no looking back since. Last week the Fed began printing money to buy mortgage debt directly. The aim is to drive down the long-term interest rates used for most US home loans. The Bernanke speech is being put into practice, almost to the letter.
No doubt, such reflation a l’outrance can “work”, but what is the exit strategy? The policy leaves behind a liquidity lake. The risk is that this will flood the system once the credit pipes are unblocked. The economy could flip abruptly from deflation to hyper-inflation.
Nobel Laureate Robert Mundell warned last week that America faces disaster unless the Bernanke policy is reversed immediately. This is a minority view, but one held by a disturbingly large number of theorists. History will judge.
Most central bankers suffer from a déformation professionnelle. Those shaped by the 1970s are haunted by ghosts of libertine excess. Those like Bernanke who were shaped by the 1930s live with their Depression poltergeists.
His original claim to fame was work on the “credit channel” causes of slumps. Bank failures can snowball out of control as the “financial accelerator” kicks in. The cardinal error of the 1930s was to let lending contract.
This is why he went nuclear in January, ramming through the most dramatic rates cuts in Fed history. Events have borne him out.
A case can be made that Bernanke’s pre-emptive blitz has greatly reduced the likelihood of a catastrophe. It was no mean feat given that he had to face down a simmering revolt earlier this year from the Fed’s regional banks.
The sooner the Bank of England tears up its rule books and prepares to follow the script in Bernanke’s manual, the more chance we too have of avoiding a crash landing.
Monetary stimulus is a better option than fiscal sprees that leave us saddled with public debt – the path that nearly wrecked Japan.
Yes, I backed the Brown stimulus package – with a clothes-peg over my nose – but only as a one-off emergency. Public spending should be a last resort, as Keynes always argued.
Of course, Bernanke should not be let off the hook too lightly. Let us not forget that he was deeply complicit in creating the disaster we now face. He was cheerleader of Alan Greenspan’s easy-money stupidities from 2003-2006. He egged on debt debauchery.
It was he who provided the theoretical underpinnings of the Greenspan doctrine that one could safely ignore housing and stock bubbles because the Fed could simply “clean up afterwards”. Not so simply, it turns out.
As Bernanke said in his 2002 speech: “the best way to get out of trouble is not to get into it in the first place”. Too late now.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/3629806/Deflation-virus-is-moving-the-policy-test-beyond-the-1930s-extremes.html

Federal Reserve battles debt and deflation

Federal Reserve is damned either way as it battles debt and deflation
We know what causes a recession to metastasize into a slump. Irving Fisher, the paramount US economist of the inter-war years, wrote the text in 1933: "Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions".

By Ambrose Evans-PritchardLast Updated: 6:34PM GMT 18 Dec 2008
Comments 66 Comment on this article
"Such a disaster is somewhat like the capsizing of a ship which, under ordinary conditions is always near stable equilibrium but which, after being tipped beyond a certain angle, has no longer this tendency to return to equilibrium, but a tendency to depart further from it," he said.
Today we call this "Gladwell's tipping point". Once it goes, you can't get back up. This is why the Federal Reserve has resorted to emergency measures that seem mad at first sight.
It has not only cut rates to near zero for the first time in US history, it is also conjuring $2 trillion of stimulus out of thin air. This is Quantitative Easing, or just plain 'QE' in our brave new world.
The key is the toxic mix of high debt and deflation. An economy can handle one at a time, but not both.
The reason why it "departs further" from equilibrium is more or less understood. The burden of debt increases as prices fall, creating self-feeding spiral. This is what Fisher called the "swelling dollar" effect. Real debt costs rose by 40pc from 1929 to early 1933 by his count. Debtors suffocated to death.
Brian Reading from Lombard Street Research has revived this neglected thesis and come up with some disturbing figures. US household debt is now $13.9 trillion, down just 1pc from its peak last year. Meanwhile household wealth has fallen 14pc as property crashes, a loss of $6.67 trillion. The debt-to-wealth ratio is rocketing.
Clearly the US is already in the grip of debt-deflation. "The obvious conclusion is that the Fed should print money to purchase private sector assets so as to drive up their price," he said.
Fed chief Ben Bernanke does not need prompting. He made his name as a Princeton professor studying the "credit channel" causes of depressions. Now fate has put him in charge of the channel.
Under his guidance, the Fed has this week pledged to "employ all available tools" to stave off deflation - and damn the torpedoes. It will purchase "large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities." It will evaluate "the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities," i.e, printing money to pay the Pentagon.
Put bluntly, the Fed is deliberately stoking inflation. At some point it will succeed. Then the risk flips quickly to spiralling inflation as the elastic snaps back. There will be a second point of danger.
By late 2009, if not before, the bond vigilantes may start to fret about the liquidity lake. They will worry that the Fed may have to start feeding its holdings of debt back onto the market. The Fed's balance sheet has already risen from $800bn in September to $2.2 trillion this month. It will be $3 trillion by early next year.
"The bond markets could go into free fall," said Marc Ostwald from Monument Securities.
"The Fed went into this all guns blazing just as the Neo-cons went into Iraq thinking it was a great idea to get rid of Saddam, without planning an exit strategy. As soon as we get the first uptick in inflation, the markets are going to turn and say this is what we feared would happen all along. Then what?" he said.
New Star's Simon Ward said all three measures of the US broad money supply are flashing recovery. M2 has risen at annual rate of 17pc over three months.
"It has all changed since the Fed began buying commercial paper in October. If the money supply is booming at 20pc in six months, inflation will become a concern. Given that public debt ratios are already on an explosive path, we risk a debt trap," he said.
For now, the bond markets are quiet. Futures contracts are pricing five years of deflation in the US. Yields on 10-year US Treasuries have halved since early November to 2.09pc, the lowest since the Fed's data began. Three-month dollar LIBOR has plummeted to 1.53pc.
It is the same pattern across the world. 10-year yields have fallen to 1.27pc in Japan, 3pc in Germany, 3.2pc in Britain, and 3.49pc in France.
The bond markets seem to be betting that emergency action by central banks will take a very long time to work, if it works at all. By cutting to zero, the Fed has come close to shutting down the US 'repo' market that plays a crucial role in providing liquidity. It has caused havoc to the $3.5 trillion money markets - as the Bank of Japan, burned by experienced, had warned. It has become even harder for banks to raise money. Some argue that extreme monetary policy is already doing more harm than good.
Mr Bernanke is known for his "helicopter speech" in November 2002, when he nonchalantly talked of the Fed's "printing press" and said it was the easiest thing in the world to "reverse deflation."
Less known is his joint-paper in 2004 - "Monetary Policy Alternatives at the zero-bound". By then doubts were creeping in. He admitted to "considerable uncertainty" as to whether extreme tools will actually work. Liquidity could fail to gain traction.
Put another way, the Fed is flying by the seat of its pants. It should never have let debt grow to such grotesque levels in the first place.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/3834108/Federal-Reserve-is-damned-either-way-as-it-battles-debt-and-deflation.html

OPEC calls on UK to cut fuel duty or risk a long-term spike in oil

OPEC calls on UK to cut fuel duty or risk a long-term spike in oil
Oil cartel OPEC has called on Western governments, including Britain, to cut duty on petrol or risk fuelling a much higher oil price in the future.

By Rowena Mason Last Updated: 2:42PM GMT 19 Dec 2008

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Sultan at an OPEC summit in Riyadh, November 2007. Photo: REUTERS
Saudi Arabia's oil minister Ali al-Naimi and Abdalla S El-Badri, secretary-general of OPEC, said low demand was "wreaking havoc" for oil producers.
The producers claimed the collapse of prices to a four-year low of $36 a barrel is harming investment in the sector, creating supply problems for years to come. "A number of upstream projects have already been cancelled or delayed," Mr al-Naimi said at a meeting of energy ministers in London.
A cut in fuel duty, according to OPEC, would encourge cash-strapped consumers to buy more petrol, bolster demand for oil and encourage producers to develop new supplies.
Ministers from 27 countries and delegates from oil organisations convened at the London Energy Meeting, hosted by energy and climate change secretary Ed Miliband.
Prime Minister Gordon Brown gave an opening speech at the conference urging OPEC and other producers to continue to invest despite the crumbling in oil prices. Mr Brown also called for greater transparency in oil trading. Western governments have so far resisted the suggestion that speculation plays a large part in shaping oil prices, but the Prime Minister today proposed tougher regulation of the market.
He said "visionary internationalism" was needed to stamp out volatility, which he described as "one of the most pressing problems" for the world today. "Wild fluctuations in market prices harm nations all round the world," Mr Brown said. "They damage consumers and producers alike."
Oil producing members of OPEC blamed some of the severe volatility which has seen oil slump from a record $147 in July to below $40 on speculative futures trading.
The cartel operated by OPEC cut supply by a record 2.2m barrels a day this week, but failed to drive the price of oil back up to its target $75 a barrel. Mr al-Naimi for the first time pledged Saudi Arabia's support for investment in green alternative energy sources, if the "fair and reasonable" target price of $75 a barrel is reached.
The London summit follows a meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, earlier this year to tackle the huge increase in oil prices to $147 per barrel.
"If anyone had predicted then that oil prices would fall below $40 a barrel at the Jeddah meeting, they would have been transported to a mental institution," said Dr Noe van Hulst, secretary-general of the International Energy Federation.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/oilprices/3850142/OPEC-calls-on-UK-to-cut-fuel-duty-or-risk-a-long-term-spike-in-oil.html

Oil at $40 a barrel will cause 'price explosion' in future

Oil at $40 a barrel will cause 'price explosion' in future
The oil cartel OPEC is right to warn that sharply falling oil prices will create a "price time-bomb for the future", experts have warned.

By Rowena MasonLast Updated: 7:16PM GMT 19 Dec 2008

The site of Saudi Aramco's (the national oil company) Al-Khurais central oil processing facility under construction in the Saudi Arabian desert. Photo: AFP
Saudi Arabia's oil minister Ali al-Naimi and Abdalla El-Badri, secretary-general of OPEC, said low demand was "wreaking havoc" by halting investment in the sector.
Oil prices in London fell near to $40 per barrel this week – down from a spike of $147 in July– prompting OPEC to cut supply by 2.2m barrels a day. Prices were closer to $35 in New York
If the low prices stop investment in exploration and production, there will be a shortage of oil in years to come, the producers said at a global summit in London.
Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for an end to oil trading volatility, acknowledging prices could jump sharply if investment faltered. However, energy minister Ed Miliband insisted that low oil prices were good for consumers and the world economy.
OPEC called on Western governments to cut fuel tax to help push prices back up to the "fair and reasonable" sum of $70 per barrel.
Inenco, the UK's largest energy analyst, agreed that slumping demand would ultimately cause prices to rocket.
Oil exploration and production projects in the Canada, USA, Mexico, Damman have recently been shelved because they have become uneconomical.
"The oil price would need to be in the range of $70-$80 a barrel to make these projects economically viable," said Inenco consultant Ian Parrett.
Sources close to BP said the oil company feared current lack of investment would create an undersupply in three to five years' time.
Barclays Capital said global spending on production will shrink 12pc to $400bn in 2009. .

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/3852773/Oil-at-40-a-barrel-will-cause-price-explosion-in-future.html

Sterling: Why it can't stop falling

Sterling: Why it can't stop falling

By Edward Hadas, breakingviews.comLast Updated: 1:43PM GMT 19 Dec 2008
Comments 4 Comment on this article

The pound just won’t stop falling. As of Friday morning, the UK currency was down 5pc against the euro over a week, and 17pc since mid-October. This decline is all too justified.
Foreign exchange traders have short attention spans and a long list of concerns. And right now the pound ticks almost every box to fail a summary health check.
Does the UK need foreign cash? That’s a big tick. The country’s balance of payments deficit is running at 3pc of GDP. Are yields low, making government debt - the holding of choice for foreigners - unattractive? That’s another tick in the box. The already low 2pc policy interest rate is set to head towards zero.
Worries about the overall financial system merit a tick too. UK banks expanded their balance sheets in the boom with an abandon usually seen in developing countries like Argentina and Turkey. The subsequent mess could end in blanket nationalisation, with all the risks of the politicised, inefficient lending decisions that often come with state control.
Now for the double tick. Currency traders don’t like governments that run big deficits, which often end in inflation. The UK government is already planning to borrow an awesome 8pc of GDP - and is likely to borrow much more.
About the only bonus for sterling right now is inflation, which is falling in the UK as it is everywhere. But even that might not last, as the weak pound drives up the price of imports, equivalent to 33pc of GDP.
For more agenda-setting financial insight, visit www.breakingviews.com
After such a rush of sterling selling, a brief rebound is possible. For longer-term optimists on the pound - yes, there are a few still out there - the main hope is that a cheap currency will spur exports. But before the Germans and Chinese can be tempted by cheaper goods from the UK, the country has to produce them. That won’t be easy, no matter how low the pound falls. The UK has moved away from manufacturing more than any other rich country. Now it is too short on intellectual and physical capacity to profit from the price advantage provided by sterling’s fall.
It will take more UK pain before there is much sterling gain.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/breakingviewscom/3850857/Sterling-Why-it-cant-stop-falling.html

Japan Offers a Possible Road Map for U.S. Economy

Japan Offers a Possible Road Map for U.S. Economy

By MARTIN FACKLER
Published: December 19, 2008

TOKYO — When the Federal Reserve cut its benchmark rate to virtually zero earlier this week, what was a historic move in Washington seemed old hat here in Tokyo.
The Bank of Japan kept rates near zero for most of the last decade in an effort to end a long economic stagnation, and raised them only two years ago. Many economists say they believe that the zero interest-rate policy finally worked in Japan after regulators took aggressive steps that succeeded in restoring faith in Japan’s financial system and Tokyo’s ability to oversee it.
Now, with the Fed and President-elect Barack Obama turning to the same sorts of unconventional policy tools to battle the worst global economic crisis since the Depression, economists and bankers say they hope that Japan’s lessons are not lost on Washington. They say the United States needs to take the same kinds of confidence-building steps, and much more quickly than Japan did.
“Japan had years of trial and error to gets its response right, but the United States doesn’t have that kind of time because markets are changing so fast,” said Akio Makabe, an economics professor at Shinshu University. “The Fed has to move, and has to move fast, to restore confidence.”
On Friday, the Bank of Japan cut its benchmark rate to 0.1 percent, from 0.3 percent, saying in a statement that it was following the Fed’s “dramatic rate cut” to lower borrowing costs and jolt global demand. On Tuesday, the Fed lowered short-term rates to a range of zero to 0.25 percent, and vowed to pump money directly into the credit markets by buying mortgage-related debt and corporate bonds.
The Bank of Japan also announced that it would try to shore up Japan’s credit markets by buying commercial paper, a type of short-term corporate debt. Central banks in Europe have also reduced rates amid concerns the global economy could contract next year for the first time in decades.
Tuesday’s rate cut by the Fed also made short-term borrowing costs lower in the United States than in Japan for the first time in 15 years. This helped drive up the yen to 13-year highs, as investors tend to favor currencies that offer higher rates of return. The Bank of Japan said its rate cut on Friday was partly aimed at capping the yen’s gains.
The Bank of Japan first lowered interest rates to zero in 1999 for a year and then again in 2001 for five years. The Japanese central bank was trying to contain a domestic financial crisis not unlike the one now crippling global markets, in which collapsing real estate and share prices caused the bankruptcy of large financial companies, like Yamaichi Securities in 1997.
The central bank’s hope was that by lowering borrowing costs to virtually nil, it could encourage commercial banks to lend more money to businesses and consumers, rekindling demand.
Economists and former Bank of Japan officials say the biggest lesson they learned was that cutting rates alone has almost no effect when the financial system has fallen into a crisis as deep as the one Japan faced in the 1990s.
Japanese banks simply refused to lend in an environment where borrowers could suddenly go bankrupt, saddling lenders with huge, unforeseen losses. The Bank of Japan tried even more extreme measures, like using its powers to create money to essentially stuff cash into the nation’s commercial banks in hopes they would start lending again.
Exasperated central bankers found that commercial banks just let the money pile up instead of lending it out.
Economists say the United States faces a similar situation, after the sudden collapse in September of Lehman Brothers created fears of additional failures. Economists also fault Washington for its inconsistency in dealing with the financial crisis, leaving the impression that it does not have a clear strategy for dealing with ailing lenders.
In Japan’s case, economists and former bankers say, credit began to flow freely again only after 2003, when regulators adopted a tough new policy of auditing banks and forcing weaker ones to raise new capital or accept a government takeover. Economists said the audits finally removed paralysis in credit markets by convincing bankers and investors that sudden failures were no longer a risk, and that the true extent of problems at banks and other companies was finally being revealed.
Economists say Washington needs to do something similar to make banks and financial companies more transparent, and reassure investors that there were no more collapses like that of Lehman Brothers on the horizon.
“The United States needs to do it like Takenaka did,” said Anil Kashyap, a professor of business at the University of Chicago, referring to Heizo Takenaka, the former banking minister who started the 2003 audits. “We need someone to come in and give a good housekeeping seal to banks.”
Economists and former central bankers said another lesson from Japan’s experience was the importance of consistency. This became apparent in 2000, they said, during one of the bank’s more embarrassing episodes, when it raised interest rates, and lowered them back to zero a year later when the economy faltered.
Former Bank of Japan officials said they learned that bankers and investors would lend in difficult times only if they believed that rates would stay low for a long period, ensuring them adequate profits. By raising the possibility of future interest rate increases, the Bank of Japan dampened enthusiasm for lending, say bankers and economists.
“We learned that zero rates work by building expectations,” said Rei Masunaga, an economist and former director general at the Bank of Japan. “Zero interest rates take time to be effective.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/business/worldbusiness/20yen.html?em

Buying Stocks on the Verge of Bankruptcy

QUESTION: Why is it that investors are buying stocks in companies that are on the verge bankruptcy like AIG (AIG: 1.60, -0.07, -4.19%) and General Motors (GM: 4.49, +0.83, +22.67%)? Is there any benefit to buying at this price, and what would be the worst-case scenario of my investment?
--Mike Ghazala

ANSWER: Let's get right to the point: The worst-case scenario is you lose your entire investment. When a company files Chapter 11 the business is reorganized, but there's no guarantee shares will be worth anything once the company emerges from bankruptcy protection. Ditto for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation, in which a company's assets are sold off. Rules governing corporate bankruptcies generally dictate that secured and unsecured creditors -- banks, bondholders and the like -- get paid off first. Stockholders are last in line, and often there's nothing left by the time their turn comes around. If there are assets remaining, stockholders may receive shares in the newly reorganized company.

So why do investors buy shares of companies on the verge of bankruptcy?

Some may truly believe the company will avoid disaster and bounce back, making the shares an attractive long-term investment.

More often than not, though, investors are looking to make a quick buck on a short-term trade. In that case fundamentals are thrown out the window. Hedge funds and institutional trading desks are often involved in highly leveraged trades of these extremely volatile stocks. With such heavy hitters in the game, and so much uncertainty surrounding the companies, we recommend that individual investors keep their distance.

One other note: Even in bankruptcy a company's shares may continue to trade, often for pennies apiece. While the low price might be tempting, liquidity is spotty because the stocks are usually forced to trade over the counter rather than on a major exchange like the NYSE.



http://www.smartmoney.com/personal-finance/college-planning/financial-crisis-answer-center/?cid=1108

The Most Dangerous Way to Invest Today

The Most Dangerous Way to Invest Today
By Todd Wenning December 19, 2008 Comments (7)

This market panic has taught or reminded investors of many important lessons, including the importance of diversification, investing only in companies whose business you can understand, and that "cash ain't trash" after all.
Another lesson that must be heeded is that "bottom up" research is a downright dangerous way to invest. To review, "bottom up" research looks at businesses first and de-emphasizes macroeconomic factors. If this market has taught us anything, however, it's that ignoring the economy can have dire consequences.

No Fa-Fa-Fa-Foolin

Picking a stock without considering the economic environment is like picking out your clothes in the morning without considering the weather that day. Sure, that Def Leppard 1987 Hysteria Tour T-shirt may be comfortable and give you tons of street cred, but it's just not practical in a foot of snow.
All joking aside, no matter what sector you're looking at, there are macroeconomic factors that will make a big difference to your investing thesis -- durable-goods orders if you're looking at manufacturers, housing starts for homebuilders.
Right now, for example, companies dependent on consumer spending are facing some serious headwinds:

The American labor force is weakening.
In the last three months, the economy has shed 1.25 million jobs. Unemployment currently sits at 6.7%. Add that figure to the 12.5% underemployment rate (part-time workers who want to work full-time), and you have nearly 20% of the American workforce not contributing its full potential to the economy. These figures could get higher, since they haven't even taken into account the massive layoffs recently announced by Bank of America (NYSE: BAC), 3M (NYSE: MMM), and Dow Chemical (NYSE: DOW).

Consumer credit is drying up.
To compound the problem of unemployment, credit card companies like American Express (NYSE: AXP) and Capital One Financial (NYSE: COF) have become much more conservative with their lending standards, raising rates, reducing credit limits, or denying credit altogether. With 60-plus-day delinquencies up some 24% since August, it's hard to blame them for these moves. But the combination of less available credit and less income from employment will inevitably lead to less spending.

Baby boomers are being walloped by this economy.
This economy couldn't have come at a worse time for the 78 million or so baby boomers approaching or already in retirement. According to Fidelity, at the end of 2007, its 401(k) participants aged 60 to 64 held a median 66% of their portfolios in equities. Given that the S&P 500 is down 38% year-to-date, it's reasonable to assume that the median boomer 401(k) lost about 25%-30% of its value this year. Besides the stock market losses, an estimated $4.5 trillion of wealth has been wiped out as a result of the real estate market crash of the past two years.
This new reality is significant on many levels, but the biggest consequence of a poorer boomer generation may be found in the retail sector. The boomer demographic accounts for about 40% of total consumer spending (about $3.8 trillion annually). Since consumer spending makes up 70% of our GDP, you can see how much a suddenly stingy boomer generation can hurt our economy.
If boomers cut just 10% of their $3.8 trillion in annual spending this year, it could set GDP back some 3%. Less boomer spending would negatively affect retailers across the board, from women's clothiers like Ann Taylor (NYSE: ANN) to casual-dining restaurants like Darden Restaurants' Red Lobster and Olive Garden.

Where we're left
Despite these mounting economic woes, there are still stocks worth buying in this market. But the research process must begin with a macroeconomic analysis, followed by a thorough vetting of businesses.
Since we launched our Motley Fool Pro service in October, we've taken the plight of the U.S. consumer very seriously, focusing our research on companies that produce goods and services that people need, versus what they want. For example, we'd be much more inclined to research a stock like Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ) versus a beaten-down retailer like Abercrombie & Fitch. Consumers can do without $100 blue jeans, but they are much less likely to do without things like Band-Aids, Sudafed, and Tylenol.
Even though Abercrombie may look like a value at the moment from a bottom-up approach, it could be an even better value six months or a year from now. After all, even value is vulnerable without a catalyst to unlock it, and there appears to be no economic catalyst in sight for consumer-goods companies like Abercrombie. Ignoring that fact could cost you money and sleep while you wait -- potentially for years -- for retail to rebound.
At Pro, we're only interested in buying undervalued stocks with both strong fundamentals and positive economic support. Our top priority is accuracy, and we have a goal of generating positive returns with at least 75% of our investments. This means we must not only be selective with the investments we make, but also fully consider the economic environments in which they operate.

Pro analyst Todd Wenning pours some sugar in his afternoon coffee, in the name of love. He does not own shares of any company mentioned. Johnson & Johnson, Dow Chemical, and Bank of America are Motley Fool Income Investor recommendations. 3M and American Express are Motley Fool Inside Value picks. The Fool owns shares of American Express. The Fool is investors writing for investors.

Time In the Market and Timing the Market

Time In The Market:

I believe time in the market, with proper asset allocation, is preferable to "timing the market," which is a fool's game. In my view, time in the market refers to:

• investing early,
• investing often, and
• staying in for the long-term.

Albert Einstein called compounding interest "the most powerful force in the universe" and it represents "time in the market" at its best.

Here's a classic example: Which would you rather have -- $1million today or one penny doubled every day for one month? If you chose the penny doubled then you are the "winner" with $5,368,709.12. Time exponentially expands the compounding effect. With less time to invest, even the most skilled traders will find themselves at an enormous disadvantage to compounding interest...

Timing the Market / Investment Outcome:

Since "timing the market" is intended to control the "investment outcome," I combine them into the same points: As for timing the market, of course it is a "controllable" investing variable and it is possible to accomplish successfully but how prudent can it be to attempt when the vast majority of investors are not successful at doing it?

Where investors are commonly misled here is with their own perception of investment gains and "chasing performance."

For example, if you invest $100,000 into a stock and it returns 30% in the first year and loses 10% in the second, is your average return 20 percent? No. After the first year, you'll have $130,000 and after the second, you'll have $117,000 for a total gain of 17% (or roughly 8.5% compounded). If you just earned an "average" 10% per year, you'd have $121,000 at the end of year two.

Now consider that you were the "average" investor and your "friend" earned 30% in the first year. Are you going to hold to your allocation earning "just" 10% or will you be tempted to jump to your friend's "strategy?" Being "average" has its merits...

While anyone can throw darts at a wall and beat the markets over a short period of time, the markets are too efficient to outperform consistently over longer periods time. Investors should not use stocks as short-term investment vehicles, anyway, and any person calling themselves a "financial philosopher" would not partake in such pursuits.

In summary, investing should be a means of making money work for you not a means of making you work for it. As author, Mitch Anthony, puts it, "life is not about making money, money is about making a life."

Now get on with your life...

You may see this blog post and others like it at the Carnival of Financial Planning.

Source:
http://financialphilosopher.typepad.com/thefinancialphilosopher/2007/06/asset-allocatio.html

Four investment variables that are controllable

The Wisdom of Asset Allocation

"God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference." Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971)

Those words underscore the foundation of prudent investing. There are things we can control and there are things we can not. Knowing the difference is imperative and "the wisdom" lies in the application of that knowledge...

Among the primary variables of investing, the investor may control:
(1) the amount to be invested;
(2) the allocation of the assets;
(3) the holding period or time in the market; and
(4) the timing of the investment.

Where investors make their biggest mistake is focusing intently on trying to control the one investment variable that is uncontrollable --
(5) the outcome of the investment (amount of gain/loss)...

Although most investors understand that the vast majority do not beat the market averages, especially over long periods of time, it is in our fallible human nature to believe that we will be among the "above average." Whether one ascribes to Jack Bogle's rantings on Lake Wobegone, where everyone is above average, or to the validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) or not, it is difficult to argue against the evidence that the greatest advantages to be gained by the investor is within a combination of the four investment variables that are controllable.

Read further:
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Those that went with Madoff chose faith over evidence

Who isn't a Madoff victim? The list is telling.
Although many smart people seem to have been taken in, one expert argues that anyone who really did their homework would have seen the warning signs.
By Nicholas Varchaver
Last Updated: December 17, 2008: 10:14 AM ET

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NEW YORK (Fortune) -- As the number of victims of Bernard Madoff, the criminally charged founder of the investment firm that bears his name, seems to multiply with the speed and force of a hurricane, certain types of investors seem to be absent -- so far, anyway -- from the casualty list.
That's no accident, argues James Hedges IV of LJH Global Investments, a boutique firm that invests in hedge funds and private equity for high-net-worth families. In other words, score one for the big institutions that stick to standard rules rather than allowing their managers to invest on personal connections or hunches.
"There's no Duke Endowment [among the list of Madoff investors]," Hedges says. "There's no Harvard management, there's no Yale, there's no Penn, there's no Weyerhauser, no State of Texas or Virginia Retirement system."
The reason is simple, in Hedges' view. Letting Madoff manage your money "wouldn't pass an institutional-quality due diligence process," he says. "Because when you get to page two of your 30-page due diligence questionnaire, you've already tripped eight alarms and said 'I'm out of here.' "
In short, in Hedges' opinion, any sophisticated entity that actually did its homework would have seen the warning signs.
Hedges got the chance to see those signs up close: In 1997, when he was advising the Bessemer Trust, the giant wealth manager, he visited Bernard Madoff to discuss investing with Madoff's firm.
"I found him stylistically like a lot of traders: fast-talking, distractable, not remarkable," Hedges says of Madoff. But during their two-hour meeting, Hedges says, "there was one red flag after another."
For starters, he couldn't grasp Madoff's investing strategy. "I kept saying, 'you've got to explain it to me like I'm in first grade,' " he says. To no avail.
Then there was the fact that Madoff was charging no fees other than trading commissions: "The notion that something is fee-less -- which is what they largely proferred -- is too good to be true."
The fact that Madoff's operation was audited by a microscopic accounting firm also worried him. "He was also so secretive about his asset base -- that was another red flag."
In the end, Hedges was uncomfortable and Bessemer decided not to let Madoff manage any of its money.
In Hedges' view, those that went with Madoff chose faith over evidence. "You've got people who

• were disintermediated [i.e., didn't have a professional representative], or
• unsophisticated, or
• went in through a personal relationship.

That's what a con man is -- a confidence man is somebody that engenders a relationship and then subsequently lures somebody into doing something that they shouldn't do." (According to the federal criminal complaint against him, Madoff has confessed that he ran a "giant Ponzi scheme." His lawyer, Ira Sorkin, declined to comment.)
Certainly many of the institutions that turned to Madoff will challenge Hedges' views, as many will face litigation from their own clients. So far, two of the large fund-of-funds with the largest sums under Madoff's control, Tremont and Fairfield Greenwich, have already asserted that they conducted extensive due diligence before investing. Many others will take the same position.
Should Hedges' opinion be borne out and corporate and state pension funds remain absent from the roster of Madoff victims -- of course, there will be many more names added to the list -- it will only heighten the Madoff tragedy. Because, in the end, it would show that this was one investing disaster that could easily have been avoided.
First Published: December 16, 2008: 5:51 PM ET