Thursday 28 March 2013

The Peter Lynch Approach to Investing in "Understandable" Stocks


The Peter Lynch Approach to Investing in "Understandable" Stocks
No modern-day investment "sage" is better known than Peter Lynch.
Not only has his investment approach successfully passed the real-world performance test, but he strongly believes that individual investors have a distinct advantage over Wall Street and large money managers when using his approach.
The Peter Lynch Approach to Investing in "Understandable" Stocks
Individual investors, he feels, have more flexibility in following this basic approach because they are unencumbered by bureaucratic rules and short-term performance concerns.
The Peter Lynch Approach to Investing in "Understandable" Stocks
Mr. Lynch developed his investment philosophy at Fidelity Management and Research, and gained his considerable fame managing Fidelity’s Magellan Fund.
The fund was among the highest-ranking stock funds throughout Mr. Lynch’s tenure, which began in 1977 at the fund’s launching, and ended in 1990, when Mr. Lynch retired.
The Peter Lynch Approach to Investing in "Understandable" Stocks
Peter Lynch’s approach is strictly bottom-up, with selection from among companies with which the investor is familiar, and then through fundamental analysis that emphasizes a thorough understanding of the company, its prospects, its competitive environment, and whether the stock can be purchased at a reasonable price.
The Peter Lynch Approach to Investing in "Understandable" Stocks
His basic strategy is detailed in his best-selling book "One Up on Wall Street" [Penguin Books paperback, 1989], which provides individual investors with numerous guidelines for adapting and implementing his approach.
His most recent book, "Beating the Street" [Fireside/Simon & Schuster paperback, 1994], amplifies the theme of his first book, providing examples of his approach to specific companies and industries in which he has invested.
These are the primary sources for this article.
The Philosophy: Invest in What You Know
Lynch is a "story" investor.
That is, each stock selection is based on a well-grounded expectation concerning the firm’s growth prospects.
The expectations are derived from the company’s "story"--what it is that the company is going to do, or what it is that is going to happen, to bring about the desired results.
The Philosophy: Invest in What You Know
The more familiar you are with a company, and the better you understand its business and competitive environment, the better your chances of finding a good "story" that will actually come true.
The Philosophy: Invest in What You Know
For this reason, Lynch is a strong advocate of investing in companies with which one is familiar, or whose products or services are relatively easy to understand.
Thus, Lynch says he would rather invest in "pantyhose rather than communications satellites," and "motel chains rather than fiber optics.”
The Philosophy: Invest in What You Know
Lynch does not believe in restricting investments to any one type of stock.
His "story" approach, in fact, suggests the opposite, with investments in firms with various reasons for favorable expectations.
The Philosophy: Invest in What You Know
In general, however, he tends to favor small, moderately fast-growing companies that can be bought at a reasonable price.
Selection Process
Lynch’s bottom-up approach means that prospective stocks must be picked one-by-one and then thoroughly investigated--there is no formula or screen that will produce a list of prospective "good stories.”
Selection Process
Instead, Lynch suggests that investors keep alert for possibilities based on their own experiences--for instance, within their own business or trade, or as consumers of products.
Selection Process
The next step is to familiarize yourself thoroughly with the company so that you can form reasonable expectations concerning the future.
Selection Process
However, Lynch does not believe that investors can predict actual growth rates, and he is skeptical of analysts’ earnings estimates.
Selection Process
Instead, he suggests that you examine the company’s plans--how does it intend to increase its earnings, and how are those intentions actually being fulfilled?
Selection Process
Lynch points out five ways in which a company can increase earnings:
1.It can reduce costs;
2.raise prices;
3.expand into new markets;
4.sell more in old markets; or
5.revitalize, close, or sell a losing operation.
Selection Process
The company’s plan to increase earnings and its ability to fulfill that plan are its "story," and the more familiar you are with the firm or industry, the better edge you have in evaluating the company’s plan, abilities, and any potential pitfalls.
Selection Process
Categorizing a company, according to Lynch, can help you develop the "story" line, and thus come up with reasonable expectations.
1. He suggests first categorizing a company by size. Large companies cannot be expected to grow as quickly as smaller companies.
2.Next, he suggests categorizing a company by "story" type, and he identifies six.
Selection Process
Next, he suggests categorizing a company by "story" type, and he identifies six:
1.Slow Growers
2.Stalwarts
3.Fast-Growers
4.Cyclicals
5.Turnarounds
6.Asset opportunities
Slow Growers
Slow Growers: Large and aging companies expected to grow only slightly faster than the U.S. economy as a whole, but often paying large regular dividends.
These are not among his favorites.
Stalwarts
Stalwarts: Large companies that are still able to grow, with annual earnings growth rates of around 10% to 12%; examples include Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, and Bristol-Myers.
If purchased at a good price, Lynch says he expects good but not enormous returns--certainly no more than 50% in two years and possibly less.
Lynch suggests rotating among the companies, selling when moderate gains are reached, and repeating the process with others that haven’t yet appreciated.
These firms also offer downside protection during recessions.
Fast-Growers
Fast-Growers: Small, aggressive new firms with annual earnings growth of 20% to 25% a year.
These do not have to be in fast-growing industries, and in fact Lynch prefers those that are not.
Fast-growers are among Lynch’s favorites, and he says that an investor’s biggest gains will come from this type of stock.
However, they also carry considerable risk.
Cyclicals
Cyclicals: Companies in which sales and profits tend to rise and fall in somewhat predictable patterns based on the economic cycle; examples include companies in the auto industry, airlines and steel.
Lynch warns that these firms can be mistaken for stalwarts by inexperienced investors, but share prices of cyclicals can drop dramatically during hard times.
Thus, timing is crucial when investing in these firms, and Lynch says that investors must learn to detect the early signs that business is starting to turn down.
Turnarounds
Turnarounds: Companies that have been battered down or depressed--Lynch calls these "no-growers"; his examples include Chrysler, Penn Central and General Public Utilities (owner of Three Mile Island).
The stocks of successful turnarounds can move back up quickly, and Lynch points out that of all the categories, these upturns are least related to the general market.
Asset opportunities
Asset opportunities: Companies that have assets that Wall Street analysts and others have overlooked.
Lynch points to several general areas where asset plays can often be found--metals and oil, newspapers and TV stations, and patented drugs.
However, finding these hidden assets requires a real working knowledge of the company that owns the assets, and Lynch points out that within this category, the "local" edge--your own knowledge and experience--can be used to greatest advantage.
Selection Criteria
Analysis is central to Lynch’s approach.
In examining a company, he is seeking to understand the firm’s business and prospects, including any competitive advantages, and evaluate any potential pitfalls that may prevent the favorable "story" from occurring.
Selection Criteria
In addition, an investor cannot make a profit if the story has a happy ending but the stock was purchased at a too-high price.
For that reason, he also seeks to determine reasonable value.
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
Here are some of the key numbers Lynch suggests investors examine:
1.Year-by-year earnings
2.Earnings growth
3.The price-earnings ratio
4.The price-earnings ratio relative to its historical average
5.The price-earnings ratio relative to the industry average
6.The price-earnings ratio relative to its earnings growth rate
7.Ratio of debt to equity
8.Net cash per share
9.Dividends & payout ratio
10.Inventories
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
Year-by-year earnings: The historical record of earnings should be examined for stability and consistency.
Stock prices cannot deviate long from the level of earnings, so the pattern of earnings growth will help reveal the stability and strength of the company.
Ideally, earnings should move up consistently.
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
Earnings growth: The growth rate of earnings should fit with the firm’s "story"--fast-growers should have higher growth rates than slow-growers.
Extremely high levels of earnings growth rates are not sustainable, but continued high growth may be factored into the price.
A high level of growth for a company and industry will attract a great deal of attention from both investors, who bid up the stock, and competitors, who provide a more difficult business environment.
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
The price-earnings ratio: The earnings potential of a company is a primary determinant of company value, but at times the market may get ahead of itself and overprice a stock.
The price-earnings ratio helps you keep your perspective, by comparing the current price to most recently reported earnings.
Stocks with good prospects should sell with higher price-earnings ratios than stocks with poor prospects.
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
The price-earnings ratio relative to its historical average: Studying the pattern of price-earnings ratios over a period of several years should reveal a level that is "normal" for the company.
This should help you avoid buying into a stock if the price gets ahead of the earnings, or sends an early warning that it may be time to take some profits in a stock you own.
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
The price-earnings ratio relative to the industry average: Comparing a company’s price-earnings ratio to the industry’s may help reveal if the company is a bargain.
At a minimum, it leads to questions as to why the company is priced differently--is it a poor performer in the industry, or is it just neglected?
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
The price-earnings ratio relative to its earnings growth rate: Companies with better prospects should sell with higher price-earnings ratios, but the ratio between the two can reveal bargains or overvaluations.
A price-earnings ratio of half the level of historical earnings growth is considered attractive, while relative ratios above 2.0 are unattractive.
For dividend-paying stocks, Lynch refines this measure by adding the dividend yield to the earnings growth [in other words, the price-earnings ratio divided by the sum of the earnings growth rate and dividend yield].  With this modified technique, ratios above 1.0 are considered poor, while ratios below 0.5 are considered attractive.
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
Ratio of debt to equity : How much debt is on the balance sheet? A strong balance sheet provides maneuvering room as the company expands or experiences trouble.
Lynch is especially wary of bank debt, which can usually be called in by the bank on demand.
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
Net cash per share: Net cash per share is calculated by adding the level of cash and cash equivalents, subtracting long-term debt, and dividing the result by the number of shares outstanding.
High levels provide a support for the stock price and indicate financial strength.
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
Dividends & payout ratio: Dividends are usually paid by the larger companies, and Lynch tends to prefer smaller growth firms.
However, Lynch suggests that investors who prefer dividend-paying firms should seek firms with the ability to pay during recessions (indicated by a low percentage of earnings paid out as dividends), and companies that have a 20-year or 30-year record of regularly raising dividends.
Some Key Numbers Lynch suggests Investors examine
Inventories: Are inventories piling up? This is a particularly important figure for cyclicals.
Lynch notes that, for manufacturers or retailers, an inventory buildup is a bad sign, and a red flag is waving when inventories grow faster than sales.
On the other hand, if a company is depressed, the first evidence of a turnaround is when inventories start to be depleted.
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable.
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable. These include:
The name is boring, the product or service is in a boring area, the company does something disagreeable or depressing, or there are rumors of something bad about the company--Lynch likes these kinds of firms because their ugly duckling nature tends to be reflected in the share price, so good bargains often turn up. Examples he mentions include: Service Corporation International (a funeral home operator--depressing); and Waste Management (a toxic waste clean-up firm--disagreeable).
The company is a spin-off--Lynch says these often receive little attention from Wall Street, and he suggests that investors check them out several months later to see if insiders are buying.
The fast-growing company is in a no-growth industry--Growth industries attract too much interest from investors (leading to high prices) and competitors.
The company is a niche firm controlling a market segment or that would be difficult for a competitor to enter.
The company produces a product that people tend to keep buying during good times and bad--such as drugs, soft drinks, and razor blades--More stable than companies whose product sales are less certain.
The company is a user of technology--These companies can take advantage of technological advances, but don’t tend to have the high valuations of firms directly producing technology, such as computer firms.
There is a low percentage of shares held by institutions, and there is low analyst coverage--Bargains can be found among firms neglected by Wall Street.
Insiders are buying shares--A positive sign that insiders feel particularly confident about the firm’s prospects.
The company is buying back shares--Buybacks become an issue once companies start to mature and have cash flow that exceeds their capital needs. Lynch prefers companies that buy their shares back over firms that choose to expand into unrelated businesses. The buyback will help to support the stock price and is usually performed when management feels share price is favorable.
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable.
The name is boring, the product or service is in a boring area, the company does something disagreeable or depressing, or there are rumors of something bad about the company--Lynch likes these kinds of firms because their ugly duckling nature tends to be reflected in the share price, so good bargains often turn up.
Examples he mentions include: Service Corporation International (a funeral home operator--depressing); and Waste Management (a toxic waste clean-up firm--disagreeable).
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable.
The company is a spin-off--Lynch says these often receive little attention from Wall Street, and he suggests that investors check them out several months later to see if insiders are buying.
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable.
The fast-growing company is in a no-growth industry--Growth industries attract too much interest from investors (leading to high prices) and competitors.
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable.
The company is a niche firm controlling a market segment or that would be difficult for a competitor to enter.
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable.
The company produces a product that people tend to keep buying during good times and bad--such as drugs, soft drinks, and razor blades--more stable than companies whose product sales are less certain.
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable.
The company is a user of technology--These companies can take advantage of technological advances, but don’t tend to have the high valuations of firms directly producing technology, such as computer firms.
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable.
There is a low percentage of shares held by institutions, and there is low analyst coverage.
Bargains can be found among firms neglected by Wall Street.
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable.
Insiders are buying shares.
A positive sign that insiders feel particularly confident about the firm’s prospects.
When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable.
The company is buying back shares.
Buybacks become an issue once companies start to mature and have cash flow that exceeds their capital needs.
Lynch prefers companies that buy their shares back over firms that choose to expand into unrelated businesses.
The buyback will help to support the stock price and is usually performed when management feels share price is favorable.
Selection Criteria
Characteristics Lynch finds unfavorable are:
1.Hot stocks in hot industries.
2.Companies (particularly small firms) with big plans that have not yet been proven.
3.Profitable companies engaged in diversifying acquisitions. Lynch terms these "diworseifications."
4.Companies in which one customer accounts for 25% to 50% of their sales.
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
As portfolio manager of Magellan, Lynch held as many as 1,400 stocks at one time.
Although he was successful in juggling this many stocks, he does point to significant problems of managing such a large number of stocks.
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
Individual investors, of course, will get nowhere near that number, but he is wary of over-diversification just the same.
There is no point in diversifying just for the sake of diversifying, he argues, particularly if it means less familiarity with the firms.
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
Lynch says investors should own however many "exciting prospects" that they are able to uncover that pass all the tests of research.
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
Lynch also suggests investing in several categories of stocks as a way of spreading the downside risk.
On the other hand, Lynch warns against investment in a single stock.
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
Lynch is an advocate of maintaining a long-term commitment to the stock market.
He does not favor market timing, and indeed feels that it is impossible to do so.
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
But that doesn’t necessarily mean investors should hold onto a single stock forever.
Instead, Lynch says investors should review their holdings every few months, rechecking the company "story" to see if anything has changed either with the unfolding of the story or with the share price.
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
The key to knowing when to sell, he says, is knowing "why you bought it in the first place.”
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
Lynch says investors should sell if:
1.The story has played out as expected and this is reflected in the price; for instance, the price of a stalwart has gone up as much as could be expected.
2.Something in the story fails to unfold as expected or the story changes, or fundamentals deteriorate; for instance, a cyclical’s inventories start to build, or a smaller firm enters a new growth stage.
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
For Lynch, a price drop is an opportunity to buy more of a good prospect at cheaper prices..
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
It is much harder, he says, to stick with a winning stock once the price goes up, particularly with fast-growers where the tendency is to sell too soon rather than too late.
With these firms, he suggests holding on until it is clear the firm is entering a different growth stage.
Portfolio Building and Monitoring
Rather than simply selling a stock, Lynch suggests "rotation“ -- selling the company and replacing it with another company with a similar story, but better prospects.
The rotation approach maintains the investor’s long-term commitment to the stock market, and keeps the focus on fundamental value.
Summing It Up
Lynch offers a practical approach that can be adapted by many different types of investors, from those emphasizing fast growth to those who prefer more stable, dividend-producing investments.
His strategy involves considerable hands-on research, but his books provide lots of practical advice on what to look for in an individual firm, and how to view the market as a whole.
Summing It Up
Lynch sums up stock investing and his outlook best:
"Frequent follies notwithstanding, I continue to be optimistic about America, Americans, and investing in general. When you invest in stocks, you have to have a basic faith in human nature, in capitalism, in the country at large, and in future prosperity in general. So far, nothing’s been strong enough to shake me out of it."
http://www.csulb.edu/~pammerma/fin382/screener/lynch.htm
AAII Journal - January 1997
By Maria Crawford Scott
Maria Crawford Scott is editor of the AAII Journal.

Wednesday 27 March 2013

Cyprus Capital-Controls Q&A


Following the deal between Cyprus and its international creditors on a bailout, there are just as many questions as answers, particularly surrounding the imposition of capital controls. Here our reporters address some of the most pressing issues:

By Matina Stevis and Joe Parkinson
Q: What actions does Cyprus need to take to enforce the capital controls adopted with last week’s legislation?
A: The Cypriot parliament passed enabling legislation last week, giving the central-bank governor and the finance minister the power to take measures to stem capital outflows. The legislation is quite generic and allows the country’s top finance and monetary officials to impose measures ranging from daily ATM withdrawals to freezing domestic interbank lending, suspending direct-debit orders and converting checking accounts into time deposits. The law allows the finance minister or, when relevant, the central-bank governor, to “take whichever restrictive measure [they] consider necessary under the circumstances, for reasons of public order and/or public security.” A decree enacting this bill and laying out the specific details of the capital controls is yet to be issued.
Q: What capital controls are already being enforced (e.g. border checks, ATM limits)
A: Customs officials said border guards at the counrtry’s air and sea ports have been instructed to check baggage and monitor whether travelers are taking more than €10,000 (about $13,000) out of the country. Any amount above that €10,000 threshold can be confiscated. Daily ATM limits vary: at Popular Bank of Cyprus (Laiki), cash-machine withdrawals have been capped at €100 euros; at Bank of Cyprus, the limit is €120. Other ATMs are operating normally.
Q: Can people bypass controls and ATM withdrawal limits by crossing over to Northern Cyprus?
A: At present, border guards at the main pedestrian crossing point on Ledra Street aren’t searching people unless they have intelligence indicating that someone is carrying a large amount of cash. That could change.
Q: How are the ATM limits and bank closures affecting businesses, such as hotels?
A: Many businesses are struggling to understand how the capital-control measures will affect their day-to-day operations, such as their access to cash, meeting payroll and other obligations, as well as the longer-term impact of the financial crisis on their businesses. “In two-three days we need to pay our employees. Will we be able to do that? What happens with the workers who get paid via Laiki?” asks Michalis Pilikos, the president OEB, Cyprus’s national business association. “For many this will be a major wound, we’ll see immediate mass layoffs and closures.” In the meantime, many small businesses are refusing to accept credit-card transactions of electronic transfers out of uncertainty over when banks will reopen and concern they may not be able to recoup the funds. Some larger businesses, like Nicosia’s Hilton Hotel, still accept credit cards but not bank transfers.
Q: When are banks likely to reopen? What will happen when banks reopen? Will even small depositors have access to their deposits?
A: On Monday, March 25, banks were officially closed for a national holiday in commemoration of Greece’s Independence Day. They have been closed since March 16. The Cyprus Central Bank said that all banks, including Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank, will reopen on Thursday at 8:00 a.m. Officials are expected to have the capital-control measures in place before then.

http://blogs.wsj.com/eurocrisis/2013/03/25/cyprus-bailout-qa/

Related:   Cyprus crisis: What are capital controls and why does it need them?



Singapore Medical Insurance Programme - MediShield


Reforming MediShield to be truly national ― Jeremy Lim

MARCH 27, 2013
MARCH 27 ― Every now and then, Singaporeans come across a media report of a medical bill in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and everyone seems to know someone struggling financially after a prolonged illness.
In fact, the late Dr Balaji Sadasivan, previously a junior minister in the Health Ministry, while undergoing treatment for cancer commented: “Cancer treatment can be very, very expensive. This is something our health system will have to deal with. It is not surprising if some patients have to sell their house (sic).”
In dealing with the financials of catastrophic illness, Singaporeans are likely most concerned about two issues: The uncertainty of illness severity with an attendant massive hospital bill, and their share of the bill.
On the former, Health Minister Gan Kim Yong has correctly identified that expanding risk pooling is fundamental.
It does not make sense for every Singaporean to try and save for a hospitalisation episode that may never materialise (half of all heart-related deaths are sudden); and besides, most Singaporeans will never be able to save enough to pay fully for a complex and long-drawn illness.
MediShield is the bedrock insurance programme intended to protect against the financial consequences of medical catastrophes. It is the only health insurance scheme created by an Act of Parliament and must be national.
However, MediShield has three limitations that prevent it from being truly national: Exclusion of pre-existing conditions from coverage, non-eligibility upon reaching 90 years of age; and sharp premium increases with age.
How can we revamp MediShield to assure that it is truly inclusive or national and covers every Singaporean?
Three changes are worth exploring. Firstly, expand MediShield to include all Singaporeans regardless of age or pre-existing illnesses.
This is a monumental decision and truly fundamental as it reframes MediShield from being a scheme run on commercial principles (albeit as a non-profit scheme), to one that is founded on social principles.
The current premium calculations are in age bands, excluding Singaporeans with pre-existing illnesses. For a national programme, it is preferable to spread risk across all age groups and all risk groups.
This would result in younger and healthier policy holders paying more, but would prevent premiums for the elderly (who have healthcare bills four times larger than their younger counterparts) from skyrocketing — and, just as importantly, enabling those with prior cancer, heart disease and the like to have affordable insurance.
Secondly, ensure all Singaporeans can afford to pay the premiums. Premiums may still be higher for the very elderly or those with substantial pre-existing illnesses, and government funding for those who cannot afford to pay their own premiums has to come in.
Thirdly, limit the individual’s risk of medical bankruptcy by imposing a cap on what patients have to pay as their share of the total bill. How this quantum is worked out needs to be transparent, though.
The cap will need to be means-tested in keeping with the government’s philosophy of targeting subsidies, but patients need to know before the fact how the cap is determined and what they are expected to pay.
A point to note: Setting caps on what patients pay does not remove the financial risks in and of themselves. It just means someone else — in this case, the government — has to bear the risk. This will have downstream consequences: The government assuming the risks really means taxpayers carry the can.
Social activists advocating for “peace of mind” for all are really asking for the government to do more AND for taxpayers to fund these measures. Is this a price Singaporeans are prepared to pay for a better Singapore? I certainly hope so.
Minister Gan also highlighted the risks of over-servicing and over-consumption. These are genuine concerns. It would be naive to depend on the “nobility” of individual healthcare professionals who are paid at least in part on a “fee-for-service” model, and equally naive to expect patients to deliberately constrain themselves for the good of society.
What can be done then? Some suggestions build on self-regulation as a professional community, a privilege society extends to doctors.
The Singapore Medical Council is the watchdog for professional misconduct and egregious ethical breaches but what about overall clinical standards of practice? Singapore has a College of Family Physicians for general practitioners and family physicians, and an Academy of Medicine for specialists. These professional bodies can step up to the plate.
Developing clinical practice guidelines and coupling rigorous auditing processes to them to identify errant over-servicing doctors would be a good start.
The government’s electronic medical records system has been in the works for almost a decade now and when fully mature, can enable audits and recognition of negative outliers.
Public hospitals already have departmental structures where doctors in the same speciality peer-review each other’s cases, appropriateness of treatment and outcomes.
These could be built upon by government mandate enabling the college and academy to take these governance practices nationally.
Robust audits will be necessary to assure the government that risks of abuse of insurance schemes can be mitigated, and these can be built up progressively.
The challenges are formidable but the reward, a truly national MediShield makes it worthwhile.
On a trip to Taiwan last year, a young Taiwanese remarked to me: “The NHI (Taiwan’s National Health Insurance) makes me proud to be Taiwanese!” Years from now, what will Singaporeans say? ― Today
* Jeremy Lim has held senior executive positions in both the public and private healthcare sectors. He is writing a book on the Singapore health system.

http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/reforming-medishield-to-be-truly-national-jeremy-lim/

Graham’s basic principles of value investing


Value investing

Value investing is a much used phrase and means, in general terms, buying something for less than it is worth. It can apply to just about anything. You can value invest in shares, in bonds, in property, in postage stamps, in vintage cars. The difficulty is in calculating the value of the thing in which you are investing. In many things (postage stamps, collectible cars etc), the only way that value can be determined at any given time is the price that someone is prepared to pay for the item at at that time. The investor in that asset is, as a result, subject to the opinion of others.

Benjamin Graham proposed a method of calculating the value of a stock and Warren Buffett has both applied and enhanced Graham’s approach.

Benjamin Graham: the ‘father of value investing’

It was Benjamin Graham who applied to the theory of investing the concept ofintrinsic value. According to Graham, if you can determine the intrinsic value of a share, then you can ascribe to that share a real value that is not dependent upon the opinion of others (the whims of Mr Market). If you can then buy that share at a price less than its intrinsic value, giving yourself a satisfactory margin of safety, you have made a prudent and rational investment. An investor who holds a diverse portfolio of stocks acquired by this process should, over time, finish ahead.

Benjamin Graham did not apply the term value investment to this investment approach; that has been done by others. He did however called this intelligent investing, indeed the only real form of investing. Buying shares on the basis of value is investing. Buying shares on other bases such as the belief that the market will rise generally, or that a particular industry is good, or that others will bid the price up, is not investment but speculation.

Graham’s basic principles of value investing

In The Intelligent Investor, Graham sets out his strategies for making investments based on value for various types of investor – passive and active, defensive and enterprising – but each approach rests on these basic principles:
  • When you buy a stock, you are buying a share in a business.
  • The market price of a stock is only an opinion of the value of the stock and does not necessarily reflect the real value of that stock.
  • The future value of a stock is a reflection of its current price.
  • An investor must always build a margin of safety into the decision to buy a stock.
  • Intelligent investing requires a detached and long term approach, based on careful research and reason, and not on the opinions of others or the prospects of short term gains.

Warren Buffett and value investing



The fact that Graham suggested different strategies for what he called defensive investors and enterprising (and more enterprising) investors does not mean that value investments and growth investments are mutually exclusive. Warren Buffett has shown that you can value invest in shares that grow over time. He has always acknowledged that his investment style is based on Benjamin Graham’s principles and he cannot understand why all investors don’t do the same thing. In March 2012, Buffett told a group of MBA  students that:
The principles of value investing have not changed from the teachings of Ben Graham until now.
Buffett identified for the MBA students the two factors that mark the value investor: a long term perspective and the patience to not seek to get rich overnight: value investors are not concerned with getting rich tomorrow but over a ten year period instead.
There is nothing wrong with getting rich slowly.
But Buffett has added his own riders to Graham’s tenets and to some extent introduced a subjective element to the objectivity of Graham, particularly in his preference for businesses with a competitive advantage.

He gave the MBA students his (and our) favorite example  - Coca Cola. He explained that people will go on drinking Coke because they like it; possible loss of markets in the Western world because of health concerns or competition is more than made up by new customers in other countries; the company has been doing the same thing for many years; it sticks to its core business; and if it decides to add a cent or two to the sale price of a Coke to adjust for inflation or to cover any loss of margins, nobody is going to stop drinking it.

At various times, Buffett has decided that Coke has fallen below its intrinsic value and stepped in and bought shares – that is value investing.

Buffett sums up value investing


When Buffett was asked to explain his investment strategy, the words that he used essentially reflect the essence of value investing: look at a stock, assess its value, work out a price that you can pay for it with a minimum of risk, wait patiently for that price and then buy in when you can. Buffett said:

Invest in equities slowly over time … And look to buy companies that will go on forever like Coca Cola … but the key is to buy equities slowly over time and don’t try to time the market. For the more serious investor, buy equities strategically, opportunistically.

10 Points on Warren Buffett's Investing



  1. Warren only invests in stuff that he understands.
  2. He doesn’t trade, he invests!
  3. His main decision making source are Annual Reports
  4. He only buys at a “good price”.
  5. He only buys things with the intention to hold them forever (no rule without exception).
  6. He holds 8% of Coca-Cola and is absolutely certain that the value of Coca-Cola will increase substantially over the next 20 years, i.e. there is no reason to sell.
  7. He only invests in simple business models (beverages, sweets, chewing gums, insurance).  If he doesn’t understand the industry, he doesn’t invest.  E.g. he doesn’t invest into technology/internet companies.
  8. He can make a purchase decision in 5 – 10 minutes.  He doesn’t overanalyze companies.  He doesn’t negotiate very much.  When the price that is offered to him is okay, he buys immediately.  When he offers a price, it’s often non-negotiable and he expects very fast decisions.
  9. He recommends not to listen to stock recommendation.  If you do that, you’re playing and not investing.
  10. He still lives in the same house he bought as a 25 year old. 


Conclusion:
I will definitely read and listen to more stuff of and about Warren!  There are some very important lessons to learn!


Warren Buffett MBA-Talk
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/1024971/Warren-Buffett-MBA-Talk

Tuesday 26 March 2013

Humbling Lessons from Parties Past by Burton G. Malkiel


HUMBLING LESSONS FROM PARTIES PAST
By BURTON G. MALKIEL
The ‘Elec-tronic” boom of 60s, the Nifty 50s boom of 70s, the Biotech boom of 80s and the Technology Bubble of 90s.
BENJAMIN GRAHAM, co-author of "Security Analysis," the 1934 bible of value investing, long ago put his finger on the most dangerous words in an investor's vocabulary: "This time is different."
Pricing in the stock market today suggests that things really are different.
Growth stocks,  especially those associated with the information revolution, have soared to dizzying heights  while the stocks of companies associated with the older economy have tended to languish.
Well over half the stocks on the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq are selling at lower prices today than they did on Jan. 1, 1999.
It is not unusual today for new Internet issues to begin trading at substantial multiples of their offering prices.
And after the initial public offerings, day traders rapidly exchange Internet shares as if they were Pokémon cards for adults.
As we enter the new millennium, how can we account for the unusual structure of stock prices?
Does history provide any clues to sensible strategies for today's investors?
To be sure, we are living through an information revolution that is at least as important as the Industrial Revolution of the late 19th century.
And much of the current performance in the stock market can be traced to the optimism associated with "new economy" companies - those that stand to benefit most from the Internet.
The information revolution will profoundly change the way we learn, shop and communicate.
But the rules of valuation have not changed.
Stocks are only worth the present value of the cash flows they are able to generate for the benefit of their shareholders.
It is well to remember that investments in transforming technologies have not always rewarded investors.
Electric power companies, railroads, airlines and television and radio manufacturers transformed our country, but most of the early investors lost their shirts.
Similarly, many early automakers ended up as road kill, even if the future of that industry was brilliant.
Warren E. Buffett, chief executive of Berkshire Hathaway and a disciple of Graham, has sensibly pointed out that the key to investing is not how much an industry will change society, but rather the nature of a company's competitive advantage, "and above all the durability of that advantage."
Yet the Internet must rely for its success on razor-thin margins, and it will continue to be characterized by ease of entry.
A drug company can develop a new medication and be given a 17-year patent that can be exploited to produce above-average profits.
No such sustainable advantage will adhere to the dot-com universe of companies.
Moreover, the "old economy" companies may not be nearly as geriatric as is commonly supposed.
We still need trucks to transport the goods of e-commerce, as well as steel to build the trucks, gasoline to make them run and warehouses to store the goods.
Precedents of recent decades offer many valuable lessons to today's investors.
Consider the "tronics boom" of 1960-61, a so-called new era in which the stocks of electronics companies making products like transistors and optical scanners soared.
It was called the tronics boom because stock offerings often included some garbled version of the word "electronics" in their titles, just as "'dot-com" adorns the names of today's favorites.
More new issues were offered than at any previous time in history.
But the tronics boom came down to earth in 1962, and many of the stocks quickly lost 90 percent of their value.
Another parallel to today's market was seen in the 1970's, when just 50 large-capitalization growth stocks, known as the Nifty 50, drew almost all the attention of individual and institutional investors.
They were called "one decision" stocks because the only decision necessary was whether to buy; like family heirlooms, they were never to be sold.
In the early part of that decade, price-to-earnings multiples of Nifty 50 stocks like I.B.M., Polaroid and Hewlett Packard rose to 65 or more while the overall market's multiple was 17.
The Nifty 50 craze ended like all others; investors eventually made a second decision -- to sell -- and some premier growth stocks fell from favor for the next 20 years.
The biotechnology boom of the early 1980's was an almost perfect replica of the microelectronics boom of the 1960's.
Hungry investors gobbled up new issues to get into the industry on the ground floor.
P/E ratios gave way to price-to-sales ratios, then to ratios of potential sales for products that were only a glint in some scientist's eye.
Stock prices surged.
Again, as sanity returned to the market and more realistic estimates of potential profits were made, many biotechnology companies lost almost all of their value by the early 1990's.
The lessons here are clear. Occasionally, groups of stocks associated with new technologies get caught in a speculative bubble, and it appears that the sky is the limit.
But in each case, the laws of financial gravity prevail and market prices eventually correct.
The same is likely to be true of the dazzling stocks in today's market.
Few of the Internet darlings will ever justify their current valuations, and many investors will find their expectations unfulfilled.
Even supposedly conservative index-fund investors may be surprised to know that very significant shares of their portfolios are invested in information technology companies whose P/E and price-to-sales ratios vastly exceed even the sky-high multiples reached during those past periods of market speculation.
At the very least, investors might well start the year by examining their portfolios, to see if their asset allocations are appropriate for their stage in life and their tolerance for risk.
Burton G. Malkiel is an economics professor at Princeton University and the author of “A Random Walk Down Wall Street" (W.W. Norton).
http://www.alphashares.com/OpEd_Humbling_Lessons.pdf

Benjamin Graham's Writings over time


Year 1934 1st Edition Security Analysis

Year 1940 2nd Edition Security Analysis

Year 1949 1st Edition The Intelligent Investor

Year 1951 3rd Edition Security Analysis

Year 1954 2nd Edition The Intelligent Investor

Year 1959 3rd Edition The Intelligent Investor

Year 1962 4th Edition Security Analysis

Year 1973  4th Edition The Intelligent Investor