The process of deciding to sell a stock is a difficult one unless an investor has developed a methodology.

The process of deciding to sell a stock is a difficult one at best unless an investor has developed a methodology and adheres to it mechanically in order to avoid inevitable internal mental battles.  

When a loss is involved, the sell decision is even more difficult because the issue of pain-avoidance is now present.

It is human nature to seek self-preservation, and pain is a phenomenon that indicates a danger to well-being.

Some investors are obsessed with safety, but most are reasonably balanced in their tolerance of the risk involved in earning a profit.  But every investor has some threshold at which pain is avoided, sometimes at ridiculous cost.  

Dealing with an investment or trading loss involves not only financial pain, but also ego pain.  A majority of shareholders at some point attempt to avoid both pains by failing to deal with the reality of their losses.  

One of the most convenient ways to avoid the pain of loss - or even of profit squandered - is denial.  They prefer not to think about it, or they minimize it.  

When specific stock positions go bad, the pain-avoider becomes a longer-term holder who is more accurately a collector of stocks.  He has no real investment motive or astuteness of value judgement and is, in fact, simply denying the pain of potential loss.

A quick look at Hing Yiap (30.5.2010)

A quick look at Hing Yiap (30.5.2010)
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=tiFErZ8v8MqO_h1W032IWIA&output=html

Benjamin Graham Checklist for Hing Yiap (30.5.2010)
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=tLfyySAMryNv7y26W1IFT1A&output=html

Home page of Hing Yiap Group Bhd
http://www.hingyiap.com/
http://www.hingyiap.com/investor_relations.html (for analysts' research reports)

Cash Flow Computation

Cash Flow Computation
The total cash flow for a period can be computed as:


Income from Operations (*see below)
+ Depreciation
- Taxes
- Capital Spending
- Increase in Working Capital
------------------------------
Total (Free) Cash Flow


Explanation:

Income from operations equals revenue minus costs and expenses and is the major source of cash.  

However, two adjustments must be made to get to actual cash inflow:

• Income from operations is before taxes are deducted, so taxes need to be subtracted here to get a corrected cash flow,
• Also, depreciation charges are included in income from operations but do not lower cash in the period, so depreciation is added back to get a corrected cash flow.

Finally, only changes (up or down) to the components of working capital (inventory, receivables, payables, etc.) in the period are part of computing cash flow.  If working capital has increased, cash is required this will need to be subtracted from total cash flow.

(Additional note:  The total cash flows used in an NPV (net present value) analysis should come from well-prepared proforma financial statements developed for the project.  The total project cash flows for a period can be computed as above.)

----

Income Statement

for the period x through y

Net Sales

- Cost of Goods Sold

-------------------------

Gross Profit

Sales & Marketing

Research & Development

General & Administrative

--------------------------

Operating Expenses

Gross Profit

- Operating Expenses

-------------------------

Income from Operations*

+ Net Interest income

- Income taxes

-------------------------

Net Income

A quick look at Integrax (29.5.2010)

A quick look at Integrax (29.5.2010)
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=txujh3smqdmRuyr5EFHRL6g&output=html

Benjamin Graham's Checklist for Integrax (29.5.2010)
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=tExTvvwUz3Wujx7jrqFlrZA&output=html

Tapping young investors

Saturday May 29, 2010

Tapping young investors
OPTIMISTICALLY CAUTIONS
BY ERROL OH

IN this week’s Monday Starters column in StarBiz, deputy executive editor Soo Ewe Jin wrote about Bursa Malaysia’s goal of getting more young adults to invest in our stock market. One suggestion from the exchange is that people should buy stocks for their children so as to kindle an interest in share investing at an early age.

It’s a modest step but the ideas behind it are important – that we should start young and that parents have a major role in shaping their kids’ attitudes towards investments. If we lose sight of these, it’s the equities market that may suffer.

To maintain its liquidity and vibrancy, our stock exchange needs a healthy proportion of buying and selling by individual investors. Last year, retail participation accounted for a third of the trading value in Bursa Malaysia’s securities market.

It’s an improvement from the 24% recorded in 2008, but still a long way from the 60% level seen about a decade ago.

In trying to draw in retail investors, Bursa Malaysia is targeting the youthful set. In the chief executive officer’s message in the exchange’s annual report 2009, Datuk Yusli Mohamed Yusoff wrote: “We are cognisant that we need the young generation investor base.”

Recent market research commissioned by the bourse found that there’s a generation gap in the Malaysian share investing arena.

The findings are presented in a booklet published as part of Bursa Malaysia’s Rethink Retail project.

According to Omar Merican, the exchange’s chief operating officer, the project’s aim is “to reach out to younger audiences to create more awareness on the capital market and how they can become more involved”.

The research has determined that investors aged between 20 and 29 make up almost 30% of the investing population but only 12% of share investors. Most of the other share investors (nearly 60%) are at least 40 years old.

It’s not that the young don’t have the money to invest in shares. They prefer to seek returns from other avenues – savings accounts, unit trust, investment-linked insurance and property.

Says Yusli in the booklet’s foreword: “We believe the future growth lies with the young Malaysian segment that is the untapped potential for the growth of this industry. There is, however, a challenge in getting more youngsters interested in viewing share investing as an option to building their investment portfolio.”

There’s a perception problem here. The research shows that the majority of young potential investors are intimidated by the risks associated with shares. They think investing in futures, options and foreign currency is less risky.

They see share investing in Malaysia as having “a strong speculative character”, and some liken it to gambling.

Just where did they get that notion? We should look at the dominant component of the share investing population – those who are 40 and above. And most of them are, in fact, parents.

Are these moms and dads teaching their children about investing in the stock market? Are they imparting the skills and knowledge that come through the experience of riding the ups and downs of the market?

If the parents cum share investors are not doing enough to help their children develop a firm understanding of share investing, the likely issue here is that they’re poor at engaging with and relating to the kids. Or maybe the parents don’t know all that much about investing in stocks.

Or could it be that parents think that share investing is so tough and perilous that don’t fancy the idea of the children going into it, in the same way that a smoker won’t encourage his child to start lighting up? If that’s the case, that’s just bad parenting – “Yes, I do it, but that doesn’t mean you should.”

There’s another possible reason for the young people’s aversion to share investing. They do passively learn about it from their parents, except that they largely pick up on the negative aspects.

The Rethink Retail booklet hints at that: “The speculative image (of share investing in Malaysia) is further fuelled with the emotional success and failure stories told by friends, family, colleagues and others”

And let’s not forget that some investors don’t rely on fundamentals and diligence. Instead, they trade based on tips and rumours. What conclusions will a child form about share investing when he often hears his parents spouting lines such as “Can still go in. They’ll push it up to RM4.30.” or “The general election is coming. The share price will surely fly?”

Bursa Malaysia has plans to convert youngsters into share investors.

In the booklet’s conclusion, the stock exchange says: “If we are able to reach out to potential investors, especially the young investors, we can change their perceptions of share investing and make shares an option to savings, deposits, property, unit trust and investment-linked insurance.”

Sure, Bursa Malaysia can do this on its own. Still, it wouldn’t hurt if the parents buy into the programme as well. But for that to happen, the parents must first believe that stocks are solid long-term investments as long as everybody plays by the rules. Now that’s the real challenge, isn’t it?

>Deputy executive editor Errol Oh is working on a pre-schoolers’ book on the stock market, tentatively titled The Stock That Sank Like A Rock. But he’s stuck because he can’t find simple, familiar words that rhyme with ‘Bursa’, ‘dividends’, ‘warrants’ (nope, ‘blackcurrants’ doesn’t work in this context) and ‘unusual market activity’.


http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/5/29/business/6342979&sec=business

When Banks Don't Trust Banks

COMMENTARY May 27, 2010, 5:00PM EST
When Banks Don't Trust Banks
Credit markets are misbehaving again. But having survived the panic of 2008, investors may no longer be so easily rattled

By Pierre Paulden

As Europe's sovereign debt crisis shows signs of turning into a contagion, infecting everything from interbank lending rates in London to the U.S. junk bond market, credit markets are experiencing déjà vu. The almost $1 trillion pledged by European finance ministers this month to bolster the region's finances has failed to mollify investors who worry that euro zone trouble could cause another Lehman-like disruption in worldwide financial markets.

A primary cause for concern now, as then, is the banks. Independent Credit View, a Swiss rating company, estimates that global banks may have a capital deficit of more than $1.5 trillion by the end of 2011 and some may need state help to survive. Libor, the short-term rate at which banks lend to one another, has shot up to 0.538 percent, the highest since July; it was less than half that as recently as March. Other types of short-term IOUs also show strain, with financial companies having to pay an average rate of 0.47 percent on 90-day commercial paper, the highest in a year, Federal Reserve data show. "Failure is not off the table for large financials," says Brian Yelvington, head of fixed-income strategy at Knight Libertas in Greenwich, Conn.



Just a few weeks ago, the credit markets were almost back to pre-Lehman normality. Investors were asking precious little of the borrowers they shoveled money at. As of mid-May, 60 percent of high-yield borrowers were able to get away with weaker investor safeguards on new debt, according to Covenant Review, a New York-based research firm that analyzes bond offerings. Caps were removed on the amount of debt companies can carry, and fewer restrictions were placed on using assets as collateral for future borrowing, effectively reducing what's available to satisfy creditor claims in a bankruptcy. All of these were symptoms of a larger phenomenon that many viewed as healthy: An appetite for risk had returned.

That now appears to have been premature. Though Lehman-style panic has not set back in, market conditions are, to say the least, fraught. Issuance of corporate debt has slowed considerably, falling from $183 billion in April to $53 billion in May, the lowest monthly total since December 1999, according to Bloomberg data. More than 19 companies have delayed or postponed $5 billion of debt deals since Apr. 13, with immediate consequences for corporate spending. Allegiant Travel (ALGT), a Las Vegas-based passenger airline, was forced to put off a $250 million bond offering that it planned to use to pay for MD-80 and Boeing 757 aircraft already under contract. Jones Apparel Group (JNY), a New York-based retailer, pulled a $250 million bond offering that was going to help it acquire a majority stake in shoe designer Stuart Weitzman Holdings. Meanwhile, companies able to raise new debt have to pay a richer premium over benchmark government securities, adding up to 1.96 percentage points, an increase of 0.47 since the end of April. That's the biggest monthly jump since October 2008, a month after Lehman Brothers collapsed. There is carnage in the market for junk bonds, which slid 4.56 percent this month, their worst performance since dropping 8.43 percent in October 2008.

The silver lining is that while bond investors are fleeing credit markets, they are moving into Treasuries, pushing up prices and lowering the government's borrowing cost. The yield on the benchmark 10-year Treasury note fell to 3.06 percent this week, down from 4 percent in April. Among other felicitous effects, that has pushed down mortgage rates and aided the fragile recovery of the national housing market; homeowners can now get a standard 30-year mortgage at 4.85 percent, down from 5.26 percent in early April, according to Bankrate.com in North Palm Beach, Fla., spurring a new flurry of refinancing and boosting new-home sales by 15 percent to their highest levels since May 2008.

Lower rates have also brought down borrowing costs for companies fortunate enough to live at the top of the credit food chain. Abbott Laboratories (ABT), maker of the lucrative arthritis drug Humira, sold $3 billion of bonds on May 24, its first offering in more than a year. The coupon on the biggest portion of the deal, a $1.25 billion slice due in 2040, was 5.3 percent, a full percentage point lower than similarly rated bonds due in more than 15 years, based on Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAC) index data. "There is a flight to quality, to solid investment-grade companies," says Nicholas Pappas, co-head of flow credit trading in the Americas at Deutsche Bank (DB) in New York.

Even high-yield debt still has fans—or at least bargain hunters willing to swoop in when they spot an attractive price. After junk bonds gained a record 57.5 percent in 2009 and 7.1 percent through April of this year, the market is "correcting," says Jeff Peskind, founder of hedge fund Phoenix Investment Adviser in New York. He scooped up the bonds of credit-card processor First Data and other large leveraged buyouts as prices tumbled this month, anticipating a rebound. First Data, bought by KKR & Co. for $27.5 billion, has seen its bonds decline 17.5 percent this month through May 25, raising concerns among investors about the Atlanta-based company's ability to roll over the $14.3 billion of loans and bonds it has coming due by 2014.

First Data is not alone. Junk-rated borrowers, some of whom were taken private at the height of the leveraged buyout boom in 2007, have $1.25 trillion of debt coming due through 2015. Their prospects are, at best, mixed. "LBOs need growth to de-lever. They also need access to capital markets to continue pushing out maturities," says Jason Rosiak, the head fund manager overseeing $2.7 billion at Pacific Asset Management, an affiliate of Pacific Life Insurance in Newport Beach, Calif.

As for the ol' Libor, well, it could get worse before it gets better. Deepening concern about the quality of banks' collateral and attempts to regulate the banking industry could force it as high as 1.5 percent by September, says Neela Gollapudi, a strategist at Citigroup Global Markets (C) in New York.

That's still a safe distance from its peak. Thus far, market participants tend to agree on one point—if the European debt crisis is a contagion, it will probably not lead back into full-blown panic. The recent experience of a brutal, worldwide, coordinated market plunge left calluses, as well as a resolve not to be left out of the next buying opportunity of a lifetime. A lesson from 2008 is that those with the nerve to wade back into markets at their scary lows can reap remarkable profits; just because some investors head for the exits doesn't mean there will be a mad scramble. As Morgan Stanley (MS) strategists Laurence Mutkin and Elaine Lin put it in a May 26 report: "The repricing of spreads in financing markets, sharp and swift though it has been, still does not amount to evidence of anything like the levels of stress during 2008. Nor, given that central banks have already revived their backstop measures, do we think that it will. Financing markets remain orderly and open."

Paulden is a reporter for Bloomberg News. With Tim Catts and Shannon Harrington.

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_23/b4181006668043.htm?campaign_id=magazine_related

The Recovery: Why Deflation Remains a Threat

GLOBAL ECONOMICS May 27, 2010, 5:00PM EST
The Recovery: Why Deflation Remains a Threat
Economic growth isn't strong enough yet to keep deflation at bay—and turmoil in Europe and market jitters amplify the risk

By Peter Coy

Bargains are everywhere in America these days. Men's shirts and sweaters were 3.4 percent cheaper this April than a year earlier. Prices also fell for eggs, peanut butter, bananas, potatoes, hotel and motel rooms, cosmetics, curtains, rugs, tools, and lawn care. Excluding gasoline and other energy items, the consumer price index rose just 0.9 percent for the year. That's the smallest increase since January 1962, when John F. Kennedy was President.

Everybody likes to save money, but flat to falling prices are not entirely good. They're a symptom of continued weakness nearly a year after the U.S. economy supposedly hit bottom. The same softness of demand that keeps goods cheap is pressuring workers. Annual growth of average hourly earnings fell from 3.5 percent in April 2007 to 1.6 percent this April.

The economic recovery, while welcome, isn't yet strong enough to ensure against the risk of deflation, in which prices fall across the board for an extended period. Deflation caused by a shortfall in demand can be dangerous. People delay purchases, waiting for lower prices, which exacerbates the slowdown. Bankruptcies rise because even though pay falls, debt levels don't. To keep deflation at bay, the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee voted in April to keep the federal funds rate at near zero. Even with an overhang of more than $1 trillion of excess reserves in the banking system, ready to be lent, committee members cut their inflation forecasts by 0.2 percentage point between the January and April meetings, to a range of 1.2 percent to 1.5 percent for this year.

Turmoil in Europe is amplifying the risk of deflation in the U.S. It's driving up the dollar's value, making American goods less competitive in world markets and retarding growth. Europe's problems also are pushing down the U.S. stock market, which makes consumers fearful and less likely to spend. The Standard & Poor's 500-stock index has fallen 12 percent from its April high. A sharp decline in oil prices since the end of April shows that growth worries are worldwide, since it's global demand that determines the price of oil. Crude hit $71 a barrel in late May, down from $86 at the end of April. Gold is moving the other way, rising to more than $1,200 an ounce by late May from a recent low of less than $900 in April 2009, as investors seek a refuge from chancy markets and banks. All the grim indicators have made their mark. "Call it a nightmare," says one of the most prominent bears, David A. Rosenberg, chief economist and strategist at the Toronto-based investment firm of Gluskin Sheff + Associates.

The decline of output during the 2007-09 recession was so steep that there's still a huge amount of excess productive capacity. According to Federal Reserve data, only 69percent of total industry capacity was used in April, vs. an average of 81percent in the previous 38 years. As for labor, the unemployment rate remains stubbornly high because every uptick in hiring encourages more people to start looking for work again—and thus boost the official jobless rate.

The optimistic take on the economy is that the threat of deflation is temporary and will diminish as excess capacity gets eaten up. Kurt Karl, chief U.S. economist of Swiss Re, says employment gains are producing income that will be spent, generating more jobs and more spending in a virtuous upward spiral. "I'm still bullish," says Karl, adding, "employment growth has turned a major corner." Deflation, he adds, "would be a permanent kind of problem only if you didn't have any employment momentum." He predicts a decrease in the unemployment rate from 9.9percent in April to about 9.5percent at the end of 2010 and about 8percent at the end of 2011.

Certainly there are some signs of progress. On May 25 the Conference Board announced that its May index of consumer confidence rose to the highest level since March 2008. MasterCard Advisors' SpendingPulse measure of consumer purchases has ticked up sharply since early 2009. Luxury retail chains including Barneys and Saks (SKS) are scaling back discounts and promotions they offered to attract shoppers during the recession. In February, Tiffany (TIF) raised prices across the store. Consultants Bain & Co. say U.S. sales of luxury goods may rise 4percent in 2010 after declining 17percent in 2009.

There are worrisome signs, though, that the recovery could stall. Employment has been boosted by the Census Bureau's temporary hiring for the decennial census, but as summer approaches that source of employment will fade. Job creation will slow as the year goes on and be "anemic" in 2011, predicts Rajeev Dhawan, director of the Economic Forecasting Center at Georgia State University's J. Mack Robinson College of Business. Says Sumit Chandra, a supply chain expert who is a partner at A.T. Kearney consultants: "The recovery is real. It's happening. But I think the magnitude of the recovery, the level of confidence we have in it, is fragile."

Kelly Services (KELYA), the temporary help firm, sees the tentativeness of the expansion at ground level. Demand for its services is strong because companies "want to maintain maximum flexibility" in case the recovery fades, says George S. Corona, Kelly's executive vice-president. Meanwhile, upward pressure on wages is nil in most segments, says Corona. "We have a lot of résumés coming in the door," he says. "We're not having to work hard to find people." Exactly. Cheap shirts and sweaters are cold comfort for unemployed people who are sitting at home in their pajamas.

With Cotten Timberlake

The bottom line: The recession created so much extra capacity that the economy is struggling to absorb it, even as the recovery takes hold.

Coy is Bloomberg Businessweek's Economics editor.

http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/10_23/b4181009637404.htm

Investors learned the lessons of the recent recovery a bit too well

COMMENTARY
May 27, 2010, 5:00PM EST

The Sun Also Sets
Investors learned the lessons of the recent recovery a bit too well

By Roben Farzad

Who could blame an investor today for feeling a tad nostalgic for the Panic of 2008? There was a simplicity to the thing. It was such a brutal and impartial rout—slaying just about every asset class—that it made you want to swear off all markets forever. There was comfort to be found in stashing a shoebox full of $50 bills in the freezer. No paperwork. No jabberwocky from your broker. Just the reassuring face of Ulysses S. Grant juxtaposed with your cold, raw fear.

By March 2009, with U.S. stocks at 1996 levels, equities had returned less than Treasuries over the previous 10-, 20-, and 30-year periods—debunking the equity-risk premium so central to Econ 101. Until, of course, the market reversed course and surged 80 percent in 13 months, reminding investors that it was at least theoretically possible to make money in equities. That change of mood edged out fear just in time for the 2010 edition of the credit crisis, an international production that began with Greece's near-collapse and soon spread to Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and beyond. The Standard & Poor's 500-stock index has now fallen 12 percent in a month, its first official correction since the new bull began last spring.

Corrections are routine and even healthy events; they come along about once every 11 months on average and wring out the excesses and false expectations that rallies inevitably bring. "To the extent that current worries squeeze long positions, extinguish optimism, or even lead policymakers to pursue courses of action that are more supportive—not more punitive—for markets, the selloff may be creating more favorable entry points for investors to buy into a still recovering global economy," writes Stuart Schweitzer, global markets strategist for JPMorgan Private Bank, in a May 24 note to clients. That may all turn out to be true—provided investors don't panic, rush for the exits, and help turn a routine recovery into the second leg of a double-dip recession.

If the lesson of March 2009 is that the sun comes up—the most brutal selloff is just a prelude to the next rally—then the lesson of the recent runup is that the sun can shine too brightly, blinding us to boulders in the road. And then it can set.

With payrolls still slack and credit still tight, the contours of these peculiar economic times are becoming apparent. Last year's snapback is not going to bring a garden-variety, V-shaped recovery. Instead, investors are again having to confront the messy unfolding of a long and overly generous credit cycle, global in nature and marked by a spate of bank and business failures. How the economies of the world digest it is anyone's guess. When the next leg up begins, though, it will mark a critical milestone for a stock market that still needs to rally by almost half to revisit its 2007 high. Getting there despite profound economic challenges is going to take some hard traveling.

"In the U.S., we have no living precedent for this," says Donald Luskin, chief investment officer at strategy firm Trend Macrolytics, whose search for domestic parallels to this credit crisis took him all the way back to 1907. "We have had a living laboratory for it in Japan for the past 15 years. But in the U.S., we're all attuned to the little upticks in metrics that don't necessarily inform much." In other words, we seek auguries where there are none by comparing traditional business cycle statistics such as payrolls and housing starts to once-in-a-lifetime lows from late 2008 and early 2009. Luskin predicts the market will be range-bound for at least five more years as companies and consumers shed debt. "This is not a particularly bearish view," he says. "It's just the expansion-less, low-return world we're now in."

Luskin's unenthusiastic outlook—which contrasts with the prevailing optimism among Wall Street strategists in a May 25 Bloomberg survey—brings to mind the "new normal" paradigm coined last year by Bill Gross and Mohamed El-Erian at Pimco, the bond giant. The idea is that a bitter confluence of deleveraging and reduced consumption and employment will necessarily bring a long period of low growth and low returns. In the absence of a healthy consumer, the neo-normalists point out, there is no other driver to magically propel the economy.

All of which is reasonable—and has largely been ignored amid a recent rush to riskier, less stable sectors at the expense of large-cap companies. This rush was less than rational; if returns are negligible and credit is tight, one would have expected investors to move into big, stable equities that pay dividends. But they didn't, even though the private equity feeding frenzy and promiscuous lending that made small-cap company buyouts all the rage a few years back are long gone. Small companies today are less likely to be self-financed and far more likely to be dependent on volatile-rate bank debt (assuming it is offered to them at all). Even so, the S&P's small-cap index has returned 3.6 percent so far this year—almost 10 points better than the 5.8 percent loss registered by the S&P 100 (the bluest of blue chips, including IBM (IBM) and ExxonMobil (XOM)). Going back to the market's low last spring, the excess return is hardly inconsequential: 90 percent for small stocks, vs. 50 percent for the mega-caps.

The lesson? The financial conflagrations of the past three years did not signal a permanent flight to quality. Appetite for the high-risk/high-reward trade is alive if not well. The resurgence of large-cap equities has, again and again, been exaggerated. According to Leuthold, a Minneapolis fund management firm, small-cap stocks now sell at a "very fat" valuation premium of 20 percent relative to large caps, an all-time record disparity. Nobody seems to care that Johnson & Johnson (JNJ), with a $165 billion market cap and impeccable financials, pays a 3.62 percent dividend—more than 10-year Treasuries. AT&T (T), the country's largest phone company, an inveterate booster of its dividend over 26 years, yields almost twice that, but its shares have badly lagged the broader market this year. All this as banks believe they are doing you a favor by advertising 1 percent for your cash.

To some, any case for U.S. stocks—small, large, whatever—is also exaggerated. Pimco is now lumping the U.S. together with Japan, France, Spain, and Greece in what it calls a sovereign debt risk "ring of fire"—an ignominious league of nations that will increasingly have problems paying their debts. That association would suggest a lot more downside for U.S. shares, whose aggregate 4 percent drop so far in 2010 is but a sliver compared with the S&P Euro Index's 12.5 percent plunge.

Everywhere you look in the U.S. and Europe is another investing dead end. Together, they make the case for aggressive allocation away from developed markets and into emerging markets—yesteryear's financial basket cases turned today's paragons of growth. According to the International Monetary Fund, the developing world has catapulted itself from 18 percent of global GDP in 1994 to 31 percent last year, with its share still gaining at the expense of Japan, Western Europe, and the U.S.

That sort of growth means it is now far too prudish to allocate a mere 10 percent of one's portfolio to developing powers such as Brazil and India. "U.S. investors should move from a U.S.-centric worldview and toward a larger allocation to emerging market economies," says John West of Research Affiliates, an index strategy shop, also of Newport Beach. "They don't face the hurricane-like headwinds of deficit, debt, and demographics that developed markets, including the U.S., do." Since the market's low, the MSCI Emerging Markets index has shot up 77 percent—20 full percentage points better than the S&P 500. Not that no one has noticed: Emerging-market stock funds have consistently taken in multiples of their U.S. counterparts for five years. And while the U.S. and Europe have swooned in the past month, the emerging markets have fallen 15 percent, a resilient showing for a category that has historically been incapable of handling contagion. West thinks that investors in emerging markets amid this global risk realignment will be disproportionately rewarded over the coming decade.

If you don't have the stomach for increasing volatility, you might just take the old advice to sell in May and go away. Or you might park your dollars in gold, which is trading at an all-time high and is certain to go higher, unless it doesn't. Or you might go to cash, which the Federal Reserve is deliberately pegging at all-time low yields, guaranteeing that inflation eats away at what you have.

The sun will rise again, but in the meantime, no one is saying anything about sleeping well tonight.

Bloomberg Businessweek Senior Writer Farzad covers Wall Street and international finance.

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_23/b4181064685899.htm

VIX, the Volatility Index Spikes Again

Chuck Schwab Is Worried About Small Investors. Should We Worry Too?

COVER STORY May 27, 2010, 5:00PM EST
Chuck Schwab Is Worried About Small Investors. Should We Worry Too?

"People are still in a state of fear," says the father of individual investing. "And with good reason." Schwab believes it is crucial for the little guy to stay invested. And his business depends on it



In 12 years as a retail financial consultant for Charles Schwab (SCH), George Pennock thought he had seen every kind of market. Then, on May 6, he and his 250 clients lived through something new. Pennock was in Schwab's office in Englewood, Colo., just outside of Denver, talking by phone with a retiree who moved his money to Schwab last year because he says he felt suckered by his old broker. While they spoke, Pennock kept an eye on his computer screen and saw the Dow drop 250 points, bounce sideways, then go into free fall—300, 400, 900 points down. His client was watching the same thing on CNBC.

"What's going on, George?" the retiree asked. "Do you have any explanation for this?" Pennock didn't. He was thinking he should end the call and contact clients who had pulled out of equities after getting clobbered in 2008 and 2009. Some left at the bottom, then sat on the sidelines while the market raced up 80 percent. Maybe they would see this as a buying opportunity.

He never got the chance. In minutes, the market anomaly was over and the Dow was heading back up. It wasn't until the next day that Pennock, 37, began to appreciate its impact on investor psychology. He arrived at his office the morning after to find 22 phone messages. By day's end he had 50—one-fifth of his client base. "A lot of the calls were nervous," he recalls. "It was, 'George, this is testing my risk tolerance.' They have deep-seated concerns that [the correction] will go on for a while and nobody knows how long or how bad it will be."

It took Pennock two weeks to catch up on all the calls. "These conversations are lengthy," he says. "They take a lot of hand-holding." Some clients wanted to retreat; he reminded them why they had made financial plans in the first place. A retired airline pilot wanted to know if the 30 percent of his assets invested in equities was too high. (Pennock assured him it wasn't.) Another investor, who had waited five months to get back into the market, worried he had missed his chance. Most simply wanted reassurance. The May 6 crash may have been a freak occurrence, but it felt like one more sign that the deck was stacked against the little guy. "They got burned very badly before," Pennock says, "and they don't ever want to be in that situation again."

Many small investors had only begun to tiptoe back into equities when the May 6 crash and the European credit crisis rocked the markets, completing a particularly cruel cycle. In the year prior—while the S&P 500 was rebounding 69 percent from its Mar. 9, 2009, bottom—individual investors withdrew a total of $11.5 billion from U.S. equity mutual funds and poured $506 billion into lower-yielding bond funds, according to TrimTabs Investment Research. By late spring, they had just begun to reverse course, venturing back into equities by channelling $13.9 billion into domestic mutual and ETF funds in March and $6.9 billion in April. By the third week of May, they'd withdrawn $29.3 million from U.S. equity mutual funds and poured an additional $8.2 billion into bonds. An American Association of Individual Investors survey taken the week of the May crash showed investor sentiment jumped to 36 percent "bearish," from 28 percent the week before. As of May 10, according to the Federal Reserve, money on the sidelines in bank and money market accounts had reached $9.36 trillion, compared to $7.44 trillion in May 2007.

The period since early 2008 "is the worst time since I began the company," says Charles Schwab, the father of the modern American individual investor. "These are the most violent markets. Most people are still in a state of fear. I'd say 98 percent are still very concerned. And for a lot of good reasons. Look at the headlines. You've got these scoundrels doing all this stuff. People wonder, 'Who can I trust?' "

Schwab is sitting in his San Francisco office—which has always been spare but these days seems downright spartan—looking out the window at the Bay Bridge and mulling the tortured psychology of the American investor. "Where are they?" he asks, then pauses and lets out a sigh. "This is the most violent period I've ever seen," he says finally. "It was the end of capitalism as we knew it. The whole definition of safety and soundness—what does it really mean any more?"

As chairman of the $4.2 billion company he founded in 1975, Schwab has reason to be worried about his customers. The success of his company depends in some measure on his financial advisers' ability to keep their clients engaged in the markets. Last year, almost a quarter of the company's revenue came from trading commissions; another 45 percent came from asset management fees. That's the tension at the heart of Schwab's enterprise. He has become the de facto therapist to the individual investor, but he is not a disinterested observer. His job—like Pennock and his other 6,868 licensed brokers—is to keep America invested. Schwab says that staying broadly diversified and firmly in the game remains the key to long-term financial security. Given what's going on in the world, should anyone believe him?

Schwab, now 72, and Vanguard Funds founder Jack Bogle are the old lions of the retail investment industry. Both played key roles in launching the golden age of individual investing—the period between August 1982 and March 2000 when the S&P 500 climbed from 102 to 1,527 and buy-and-hold seemed the surest path to security. Bogle was the pioneer of mutual funds and Schwab opened the door to equity trades for small investors. When Congress deregulated brokerage fees in 1975, some brokerage houses responded by raising fees; Schwab slashed his, making investing affordable for the middle class and becoming broker to the masses. His company's revenues grew from $387 million in 1990 to $5.8 billion in 2000. By then, it was offering round-the-clock trading, sophisticated investment analysis, and a mutual fund supermarket. Long before Starbucks (SBUX), Schwab's branches were gathering places for market enthusiasts—office workers, day traders, and loiterers who stopped by to check stock quotes, mull their next move, brag about their big scores, and indulge in a group fantasy about a spectacular new way to get rich.

As individual investing became a way of life, Schwab inevitably drew competitors—rival discount brokers (and, later, discount online brokers) such as Ameritrade (AMTD) and E*Trade (ETFC), and full-service houses such as Fidelity. Schwab's company rode the late-1990s tech boom but was battered by the steep drop in trading following the 2000 crash. Schwab himself moved out of the top job in 2003, only to move back in a year later, renewing the company's commitment to the small investor. (Today the chief executive officer is Walt Bettinger.) During the financial panic of 2008, Schwab attracted investors fleeing Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, E*Trade, and other battered firms. That new business helped boost Schwab's assets under management 25 percent to $1.4 trillion last year from the prior year (compared with $1.5 trillion at Fidelity, $350 billion at TD Ameritrade, and $162 billion at E*Trade) but Schwab's revenue fell 19 percent under pressure from low interest rates. The company's stock was trading around $16 last week, down $3 from one month before.

Since 1986, Schwab has written four books on investing. He is an optimist by nature, one who has always preached asset allocation, diversification, and investing for the long term. By empowering individual investors at the start of the bull market, he and Bogle and Fidelity's marquee investor Peter Lynch inadvertently created a monster. As playing the market became a national pastime, investing turned into a synonym for stockpicking. Equities were thought of as savings. Today, legions of investors are torn between a newfound desire for safety and the allure of old, bad habits.

Worse, as Americans became do-it-yourselfers and sometimes day traders, their success—especially during the inflating of the dot-com and real estate bubbles—masked a profound shift in the balance of power. Wealth was migrating to institutions, hedge funds, and investment banks like Goldman Sachs (GS), which had created proprietary desks to trade ever more esoteric instruments for their own accounts. Institutional investors now own about 70 percent of American corporations, up from 35 percent in 1975, according to Bogle. As trading algorithms grew more complex and computers sped up, every advantage went to the big guys.

The Yale School of Management has conducted a "buy on dips" survey since 1989, a confidence index that measures investors' willingness to buy after market drops of 3 percent or more. Institutional and individual investor sentiment tracked closely until 2007. At the height of the Dow Jones industrial average, in October 2007, 61 percent of each group said they would buy on dips. Since then they have diverged. By March 2010, 71.6 percent of institutional investors were willing to buy on dips compared to only 57.5 percent of individuals.

In other words, small investors need more help than ever. "Before, nobody needed advice—most just called me up to place their trades," says Robinson Martin, a financial consultant in Schwab's Cobb County (Ga.) office, on the outskirts of Atlanta. Now Martin and others are no longer cheerleaders and trade executors; they are psychologists, trauma experts, counselors, empathizers. It's a delicate balance. In pre-crash days, the company's clients were mostly avid investors. Rarely did Schwab have to coax them into the market. But that's what the company has to do now to prop up the assets it oversees. It's what it has to do to juice its own adviser business. It's what Charles Schwab has preached from the beginning—asset allocation over time. And it's what he does, as well. In August 2007, near the very top, he invested the more than $10 million he'd received from the company's sale of its U.S. Trust unit in a portfolio divided between 50 asset classes. Then he left it. After losing about 30 percent of its value at its lowest point, it is now down about 12 percent, he says. "I follow my own advice," he says. "I'm not running for the hills. Yes, those investments might be somewhat down from '07, but they will be at higher values next year or the year after. I don't know exactly when, but I believe it because of my confidence in the American economic system. If you don't have that confidence, then you definitely should not be a client of Schwab."

Atlanta is a buy-and-hold town, loyal to local favorites Coke, (KO) SunTrust Bank (STI), Delta Air Lines (DAL), and Home Depot (HD), says Martin, 38, as he prepares to conduct a client seminar on a sunny weekday at Schwab's Cobb branch. THe old rules don't work any more, he says. You can't buy and hold anything with confidence, and that's rattling even those who didn't follow the rules during the bull market.

Martin's conference room, inside a tall, glass-and-steel building in a suburban office park, feels like a relic of more prosperous times as a dozen strangers unwrap turkey and ham sandwiches and start talking about the markets. Most are retirees; three are doctors, one a former restaurant owner. They have come to get a market outlook that turns out to be cautiously optimistic. No matter. For nearly two hours, the conversation ricochets from one fear to another—mostly about what could blindside them next. Fannie and Freddie? Inflation? Government spending debasing currencies? "I look at what's happening in Greece, and I see us. I think that could happen here," says James Wood, an Atlanta neurosurgeon.

No one at the conference table knows what to believe anymore, and with good reason. "I had absolutely no idea how deeply the subprime mortgages had penetrated into the financial markets." says Dyckman Poland, a retired engineer. How are investors supposed to make informed decisions when they can't trust what's printed on corporate balance sheets, asks Dr. Wood. How much of the market is ruled by computer-generated trading anyway, another asks, "while you and I are just putting in our dribs and drabs? How do we individuals fit into all this?" Bob Bonacci, the vice-president of a business-services firm in nearby Kennesaw, looks around the table. "I think the majority of us are at or near retirement," he says. "We've taken a hit once, and now it looks like we're on the brink of another situation where it could all be taken away from us. For us, these mistakes are really going to count."

As the stock market fell toward the bottom in March 2009, Schwab distributed videos to its clients in which the founder tried to strike a reassuring tone. Just hang on, he urged. "We told them," Schwab says, "the world was not coming to an end." Yet just as they had after every market crash since 1987, investors fled to safety at the wrong moment, trading equities for cash and fixed income. "It is too darned bad," Schwab says. "So many people held on and held on and held on through 2008, and finally, by early 2009, they'd had enough. Then just at the wrong moment, they got to the pitch of emotion and they said, 'I've had enough.' And chucked it in and sold. Fear took over in the most extreme way." To steady their nerves, the company puts out books, seminars, articles, and the famous "Talk to Chuck" ads. "One of our chief roles is to try to help people through this thing," he says. "But we can't help people overcome the power of fear. Or the power of greed. Those are too much a part of human instinct. We are not psychiatrists."

Now, Schwab says, his biggest worry is that investors will miss out again. They have $2.98 trillion stashed in money market funds, according to TrimTabs, and lots more in CDs and savings accounts. "If you're not an investor, you get no return on your savings and you have this very difficult situation coming up in the next three to five years of inflation that will just take away whatever you might get in some kind of yield. My fear is that inflation will come back and people will throw up their hands and say: 'Jeez, I wish I'd done something to protect myself.' "

That may sound self-serving. Except that, barring a return to a raging bull market, Schwab stands to benefit more, at least in the short-term, if its clients stay paralyzed. If interest rates take off, as the company expects they will by next year, its earnings will soar. That's because Schwab began to change its business mix a decade ago. Foreseeing an end to the bull market and with it, a decline in trading volume, it reduced its dependence on trading to 24 percent of total revenue last year from about 40 percent in 2000. It increased its asset management business and added the Charles Schwab Bank, offering retail banking and mortgage services—thus turning itself into more of a discount investor-services firm than a mere brokerage. It derives much more of its revenue from fees for managing and administering assets (45 percent last year, vs. 27 percent in 2000) and net interest revenue from the cash in its bank and money market funds (29 percent last year, vs. 22 percent in 2000).

If Schwab had not waived the fees it charged on money market funds last year—a move Schwab ordered because their interest yield was so low—trading would have accounted for just 20 percent of last year's revenue and interest would have accounted for 32 percent. And if interest rates do head higher, a report by JPMorgan Chase (JPM) analyst Kenneth B. Worthington said this month, Schwab's earnings will react like a "coiled spring." As rates rise from 2010 to 2012, he predicts, Schwab's net income will more than double.

"We make little bits of money on everything, for the most part," says Schwab. "We are completely neutral about what you do. We would probably make more money on money that sits in a money market fund than on a stock you buy and hold. But we don't have an agenda. We really don't."

Yet the Schwab brand is not about making a killing by collecting interest on the money that clients have sitting in their accounts. The brand lives and dies by "Ask Chuck," as a place where befuddled investors go to not get screwed. And Schwab can't continue to be the "Trusted Advisor" if the client assets of its advisory business aren't growing. It's got to show that it's helping investors, and that means guiding them into vehicles that show growth, not stagnation. "Individual investors must understand asset allocation," says Schwab. "With just a few thousand dollars, you can get a little slice of this and a little slice of that—large caps, small caps, emerging markets, and then build on it," he says. The point is not to get in on the ground floor of the next Google (GOOG) and ride a juggernaut. "You're going to get maybe 5 to 10 percent per annum over 5 to 20 years—maybe 30. That's still pretty good."

The day after the Schwab seminar in Atlanta, one of its attendees, Gene Perkins, 66, returned to Robinson Martin's office. Though he has done his own investing since he sold his restaurant business three years ago, Perkins is now enlisting SChwab so he doesn't get burned, as he did in the 2008 crash when his investments lost 28 percent of their value. He and Martin are working on an asset allocation plan, and it's pretty tough going. Perkins' approach to investing is practically bipolar. At first, he presses Martin about the safest assets. "So what if you just buy treasuries and CDs?" Perkins asks. "Would it kill me to lose a little ground [to inflation] if it lets me sleep at night? It's all relative."

Within minutes, Perkins is trying to elicit a little stockpicking from Martin. That hybrid approach was a big winner during the long bull market. Even disciplined investors could dip in now and then, roll the dice and maybe make a windfall. "You're going to be mad at me for bringing this up," Perkins says. "But if the market tanks, there's going to be some good buys....Let's say the market closes down 80...I may be wrong, dead wrong, and I hope I am. But I got eight or nine stocks here...." He gestures to a hand-scrawled list: McDonald's (MCD), BP (BP), Altria (MO), Citi (C). He's got good arguments for each. "McDonald's is at $68—that's my business. If I can get it at $65, that's a good deal. And Citi...I can wait it out. If Citi is still at $4 a share four years from today, well then I deserve to lose money on that account."

Martin listens patiently and then shakes his head. "Gene, that's too much risk," he says. What will Perkins do with the gains? "Keep it in cash?" Perkins ventures. "Or wait till the market tanks again and buy some more deals?" Responds Martin: "Gene, that's head fakes. When the market tanks again, you will pull everything out. You are playing Vegas odds."

Perkins slumps back in his chair. "I just have a lot to make up. I can't afford to take another hit."

Martin continues calmly: "You said McDonald's and Citi, Gene, and that may well be. But what you're missing is a hedge. Asset allocation is your hedge. You started this conversation with capital preservation, and what capital preservation has to be is a balance between risk and growth. Ultimately what we're trying to do is get out of the guessing game."

Martin keeps trying, his bedside manner patient but firm. Once Perkins has a plan in place, his assets will be invested broadly across asset classes to mitigate his risk. What he has to decide is the balance between risk and reward. With a financial plan working for him, "it's all math at that point," explains Martin. The hard part for so many investors is having to constantly recalibrate the portfolio to keep the asset classes in line with each other. That means scaling back on—not rushing into—sectors that are growing fast. To individual investors who came of age in a bull market, it's all painfully counterintuitive.

Perkins has heard it all before. "Asset allocation is the opposite of market timing, I do understand that," he sighs. "You all have made that crystal clear." And then he gets to the heart of the matter, the reason these investing decisions are causing him so much agony. He has no heirs. He will begin drawing on his retirement funds at 70. "If I live to be 90...if I start drawing at 70, will there be enough?" The subprime crash was a huge setback, and now he doesn't know. "I don't need to have anything left over. I'd like to be broke when I'm dead. I don't even need a casket. As long as I have enough. I just don't want to run out before I die."

Morris is a Bloomberg Businessweek contributor.

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_23/b4181058561674.htm

Why Financial Plans Are Worthless

March 15, 2010, 12:10 PM
Why Financial Plans Are Worthless
By CARL RICHARDS



Carl Richards

I read somewhere that average Americans will spend more time planning their vacation to Disneyland than they will planning their financial future.

I’m not sure that’s correct, but it wouldn’t surprise me. There are a number of reasons why we are hesitant to spend time planning for our financial future, but the biggest one is that we have confused the process of planning with the end product, a plan.

Financial plans are worthless, but the process of planning is vital. Let me explain the difference.

Creating a traditional financial plan starts by making a bunch of assumptions. These assumptions can be about inflation, what the stock market will do, how much you will save, when you will retire, how much you will spend in retirement and even when you’ll die.

If you have been through this process, you know that it’s very uncomfortable. We know that no matter how hard we try, we will definitely be wrong.

This is one of the cruel ironies of any plan: You don’t have the information you need when you start. This is true when you start a restaurant, a business or are planning the rest of your financial life.

If we accept the fact that even the best plan will be wrong, we can focus our energy on the process of planning instead of obsessing over the assumptions.

Sure we need to chart a course where we think we are headed, and this will involve making some assumptions about the future. But they are just guesses; make them and move on.

Think of this as the difference between a flight plan and the actual flight. Flight plans are really just the pilot’s best guess about things like the weather. No matter how much time the pilot spend planning, things don’t always go according to the plan.

In fact, I bet they rarely go just the way the pilot planned. There are just too many variables. So while the plan is important, the key to arriving safely is the pilot’s ability to make the small and consistent course corrections. It is about the course corrections, not the plan.

Once you have a general idea of your own destination, the focus should shift to what you can do over the short term to get there. Focus on the next three years. Thinking in shorter time frames inspires us to act instead of worrying about all of the things that are out of our control.

So set a course quickly. Realize that you will be wrong, and plan on making course corrections often.


http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/15/why-financial-plans-are-worthless/

Is Europe heading for a meltdown?

Is Europe heading for a meltdown?

This financial crisis is worse than the sub-prime crash of 2008 because the sums are so much bigger and it is governments that are in dire straits. Edmund Conway explains the dangers.

By Edmund Conway
Published: 8:21AM BST 27 May 2010
Comments 201 | Comment on this article

Mervyn King, the Bank of England Governor, summed it up best: "Dealing with a banking crisis was difficult enough," he said the other week, "but at least there were public-sector balance sheets on to which the problems could be moved. Once you move into sovereign debt, there is no answer; there's no backstop."
In other words, were this a computer game, the politicians would be down to their last life. Any mistake now and it really is Game Over. Or to pick a slightly more traditional game, it is rather like a session of pass-the-parcel which is fast approaching the end of the line.

The European financial crisis may look and smell rather different to the American banking crisis of a couple of years ago, but strip away the details – the breakdown of the euro, the crumbling of the Spanish banking system to take just two – and what you are left with is the next leg of a global financial crisis. Politicians temporarily "solved" the sub-prime crisis of 2007 and 2008 by nationalising billions of pounds' worth of bank debt. While this helped reinject a little confidence into markets, the real upshot was merely to transfer that debt on to public-sector balance sheets.

This kind of card-shuffle trick has a long-established pedigree: after the dotcom bust, Alan Greenspan slashed US interest rates to (then) unprecedented lows, which helped dull the pain, but only at the cost of generating the housing bubble that fed sub-prime. It is not so different to the Ponzi scheme carried out by Bernard Madoff, except that unlike his hedge fund fraud, this one is being carried out in full public view.

The problem is that this has to stop somewhere, and that gasping noise over the past couple of weeks is the sound of millions of investors realising, all at once, that the music might have stopped. Having leapt back into the market in 2009 and fuelled the biggest stock-market leap since the recovery from the Wall Street Crash in the early 1930s, investors have suddenly deserted. London's FTSE 100 has lost 15 per cent of its value in little more than a month. The mayhem on European bourses is even worse, while on Wall Street the Dow Jones teeters on the brink of the talismanic 10,000 level.

Whatever yardstick you care to choose – share-price moves, the rates at which banks lend to each other, measures of volatility – we are now in a similar position to 2008.

Europe's problem is that the unfortunate game of pass-the-parcel came at just the wrong moment. It resulted in a hefty extra amount of debt being lumped on to its member states' balance sheets when they were least-equipped to deal with it.

Europe was always heading for a crunch. For years, the German and Dutch economies pulled in one direction (high saving, low spending) while the Club Med bloc – Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy (and their Celtic outpost Ireland) – pulled in the other. At some point, there was always going to be a problem, given that these two economic blocs were yoked together in the same currency, controlled by the same central bank. By triggering the global recession and shovelling an unexpected load of debt on to Greece's balance sheet, the financial crisis has effectively smoked out the European folly.

The Club Med nations – and in many senses Britain – were not so different to sub-prime households: they borrowed cheap in order to raise their standards of living, ignoring the question of whether they could afford to take on so much debt. But, as King points out, sub-prime households – and the banks that lent to them – can usually be bailed out. The International Monetary Fund simply does not have enough cash to bail out a major economy like Spain, Italy or, heaven forfend, Britain. So, again, we find ourselves in unknown territory.

There are plenty of episodes in history when countries have been as indebted as they are now, but they are all associated with periods of war. History shows that when nations reach as high a level of indebtedness as Greece, and have as few prospects of growth, they will almost certainly default. Indeed, the IMF, which has pretty good experience of fiscal crises, privately recommended that Greece restructure its debt (a kind of soft default, renegotiating payment terms). It was refused point-blank by the European authorities.

To understand why, step back for a moment. It is fashionable to compare the current situation to the Lehman Brothers collapse, but that understates its severity. The sub-prime property market in the US, together with its slightly less toxic relatives, represented a $2 trillion mound of debt. The combined public and private debt of the most troubled European countries – Greece, Portugal, Spain and so on – is closer to $9 trillion.


Moreover, whereas the pain from sub-prime was spread out relatively widely, with investors hailing from both sides of the Atlantic, the owners of the suspect European debt tend almost exclusively to be, gulp, Europeans. No one is suggesting all of this debt will go bad, but the European policymakers fear that the merest hint that Greece might default would spark a chain reaction that would cause a more profound crisis than in 2008.

The problem is not merely that holders of Greek government debt would dump their investments, or even that they would ditch their Spanish and Portuguese bonds while they were at it. It is that government debt is the very bedrock of the financial system: should Greek government bonds collapse, the country's banking system would become insolvent overnight. In fact, banks throughout the euro area would be at risk, given that they tend to hold so much of their neighbours' government debt. That, at least, is the theory, but as was the case in the aftermath of Lehman's collapse, no one really knows how great their exposure is.

The other, more cynical, explanation for Brussels' refusal to countenance default is that it fears that this would fatally destabilise the euro project itself – which of course it would. But as the politicians are discovering, organising a European sovereign bail-out is far, far more difficult than rescuing a bank. It took barely more than a few days in September 2008 for the Government to push through the semi-nationalisation of Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS.

Earlier this month, when the French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the continent would be saved by a "shock and awe" $1 trillion bail-out package, markets convinced themselves for a moment that the politicians might be able to manage it. But the challenge of having to co-ordinate an unprecedented rescue across a 16-nation region without a common language or central Treasury is proving too much for Europe's leaders. Add to this the fact that most citizens (particularly in Germany) resent the idea of bailing each other out at all, and are willing to vote out their governments to prove it, and you get the idea of the challenge at hand.

Despite his rather aloof appearance, European president Herman Van Rompuy put it pretty well this week, saying: "Today, people are discovering what a 'common destiny' in monetary matters means. They are discovering that the euro affects their pensions, savings, and jobs, their very daily life. It hurts. In my view, this growing public awareness is a major political development. It forces the governments to act."

That action, so far as Van Rompuy is concerned, means more integration and some eye-watering spending cuts across the continent. Unfortunately, both are being carried out in haphazard fashion. The bail-out package may pave the way for a central EU Treasury, but it is still being muddled through the legislative process, and could well fall foul of voters in France or Germany. Spain and Italy are, rightly, inflicting severe cuts on their budgets, but so is Germany, which ought, according to a host of economists including Mervyn King, to be spending more, not less.

In the meantime, European politicians, torn in one way by their voters, in another by Brussels, emit even more confusing signals which only destabilise markets further. Angela Merkel's ban on investors short-selling German bank shares, and the collapse of a swathe of Spanish savings banks have hardly helped, either. And all the while, the euro continues to fall as investors mull its fate. The single currency can survive – but only if its members agree to more political union, and the prospect of that would be about as palatable to the people of Europe this summer as an ouzo and retsina cocktail.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/edmundconway/7770265/Is-Europe-heading-for-a-meltdown.html

Diary of a Private Investor: how the pros make money from turbulence

Diary of a Private Investor: how the pros make money from turbulence

Unfortunately there is no foolproof system to deal with these sort of situations. When a panic occurs, it is usually right to buy.

By James Bartholomew
Published: 9:49AM BST 27 May 2010


What a daunting few weeks this has been in the stock market. In normal times, one or two worries present themselves. Recently they have had to form a queue.

It was bad enough when we were just worrying about Greece and its budget deficit. One of the scary numbers I came across was that German financial institutions hold $37bn in Greek bonds. That, I presume, is not counting money lent in forms other than bonds. If Greece defaulted, some major German banks would take a big hit. Think through all the consequences of that and you get to higher lending costs around Europe and renewed recession.

My shares quoted in Hong Kong were probably not too worried about that but they spiralled down for a different reason. China has tightened lending to quieten down property prices. And what are my biggest holdings in that area? Why, property companies of course.

Back home, growing anguish about the coalition government's apparent aim to tax capital gains more heavily in future is encouraging people to sell sooner rather than later. On Friday last week, I myself sold some Healthcare Locums (at 223p) held by one of my children to use up the tax free allowance under the current rules. The fear must be that many people will decide not to reinvest after selling if the new regime is harsh.

Then came news that the North Korean dictator has taken it into his head to prepare for war. Next came a crisis among Spanish banks. For those of us who are pretty fully invested, the bad news has been relentless. It has been like the charge of the light brigade: "Cannon to the right of them, cannon to the left of them, cannon in front of them … into the mouth of hell rode the six hundred"

Unfortunately there is no foolproof system to deal with these sort of situations. When a panic occurs, it is usually right to buy. But sometimes it is better to get out because the fears will turn out to be justified. As concerns about an uprising in Russia increased in 1917, I expect prices of Tsarist bonds fell back. It probably looked clever to buy on the dip. Unfortunately, as it turned out, when the communists took over, the bonds lost all their value except as wallpaper. So it all depends on how things actually turn out. Right now, if Greece and Spain do not default and if North Korea thinks better of starting a war, shares are cheap. On the other hand …

Investment obliges you to take a view on how things will turn out in politics and all sorts of other things. That is one of the things that makes it so interesting. Another aspect of investment is the influence of personality. I tend to be optimistic and that is probably key to why I think that we will probably muddle along. In any case, it occurs to me that even if North Korea attacks, this will probably not stop people going to have a drink at the pubs owned by one of my companies, Enterprise Inns. Some things you can rely on.

Last week I was even sanguine enough to buy more shares in Paragon, a mortgage lender, which came out with good results and made hopeful noises about restarting active lending. The purchase turned out to be horribly timed. I bought at 151p and, after the market falls, they are licking their wounds, as I write, at 133p. On Monday, my fears about Greece increased, and I wanted to reduce my exposure to further market weakness without selling any of my favoured companies. So I tried something I have never done before. I bought a few shares in an Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) designed to go up if the stock market goes down. It has the strange name, DB X-trackers FTSE 100 Short, and I bought at 938p.

Incidentally, I was astonished to see how big this fund is. The market capitalisation is an amazing £1.4bn. I had not realised just how big the business of being bearish on shares has become. This is just one of a number of such funds. But on Tuesday, the market fell so far and so fast – with Enterprise Inns down 10pc for example – that I decided the bearish trend had gone too far. I sold my bearish ETF for a little profit at 981p.

Unfortunately this bit of good timing was with only a tiny amount of money. Overall, I have been nearly fully invested and my portfolio had taken a bit of a battering.


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Some comments:

Thank you Jo.
Padraig, I am sorry but you are wrong in so many ways. Long term 'investing' is just as risky as short term trading. It's all a 'gamble' as you put it, I prefer the term 'bet' as it is all about calculated risk. You're right in that gambling loses in the long run but proper trading is not gambling. You are also right that it is impossible to pick market movements correctly all the time. One does not need to and I am often wrong, but I manage my risk effectively and ensure I capitalise on the times when I am right so that I make money. I do this over and over and over. The stock market is not the only thing to money on and markets do not go up all the time. How can you say that the only way to make money is in a strong bull market,just sell futures!

And yes as you have all pointed out Warren Buffet is succesful, but he not the only one in the world. Please measure your success your own way. Mr Buffett is not the only succesful investor in the world. There are thousands. Mr Buffet has done extrememely well but I could not replicate his success with his style as my personality is not suited for the long term approach. In reality I will not be as rich as him because the volumes in the market will not accommodate my short term approach and that is fine by me. I make money and so do many others.

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Don't see your point, Paul. Stock or currency, bull or bear, you can make money. Day trading is fine if you're after 5% gains here and there, but most of us are here for 5 years or so, therefore long positions on shares are a much better idea.

I too am mostly all-in, James. It’s been a pretty stressful year or two, hasn't it? I've gone from 50% up to 35% down since Xmas, crazy times.

I agree entirely with you on the topic of your post, probably one of the most important lessons for any new PI for that matter.

Confident in Sarkozy talking tosh, I managed to pull out a blinding FTSE short (a proper CFD short, not an ETF) following the brief rally last week. It's shooting up today, but that was a lot of resistance on the 5k line it broke through on Tuesday, so I'm not too confident s/term - any any ideas for next week??!

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/shares-and-stock-tips/7767939/Diary-of-a-Private-Investor-how-the-pros-make-money-from-turbulence.html

The Time Value of Money

"A bird in hand (today) is worth two in the bush (tomorrow)."

Everyone would rather have a dollar in his or her pocket today than to receive a dollar far into the future.  Today's dollar is worth more - that it has more value - than a dollar received tomorrow.

The three main reasons for this difference in value are:

1.  Inflation.
Inflation does reduce purchasing power (value) over time.  With a 5% per year inflation, a dollar received a year from today will only buy 95c worth of goods.

2.  Risk
There is always the chance that the promise of a dollar in the future will not be met and you will be out of luck.  The risk could be low with a CD at an FDIC insured bank; or the risk could be high if it is your brother-in-law who is promising to repay a personal loan.

3.  Opportunity Cost.
If you loan your dollar to someone else, you have lost the opportunity to use it yourself.  That opportunity has a value to you today that makes today's dollar worth more than tomorrow's.

These three concepts - inflation, risk, and opportunity cost - are the drivers of present value (PV) and future value (FV) calculations used in capital budgeting and investing.

Present value (PV) calculations are used in business to compare cash flows (cash spent and received) at different times in the future.  Converting cash flows into present values puts these different investments and returns onto a common basis and makes capital budgeting analysis more meaningful and useful in decision-making.

Nominal dollars are just the actual amount spent in dollars taken out of your wallet.  Real dollars are adjusted for inflation.  When you take out inflation (i.e. convert from 'nominal dollars' into 'real dollars') the price difference becomes much more comparable and easy to explain.

Capital Budgeting

In capital budgeting, different projects require different investment and will have different returns over time.  In order to compare projects "apples to apples" and "oranges to oranges" on a financial basis, we will need to convert their cash flows into a common and comparable form.  That common form is present value.

Simply put, a little bit of cash that is invested today followed by lots of cash returned in the near future would be a REALLY GOOD financial investment.  

However, lots of cash invested today followed by a little bit of cash returned in a long time would be a REALLY  BAD investment.

Capital budgeting analysis is as simple as that.